Polling put his candidacy at around 7-10% of the national vote this time around, with the strong incumbent expected to pull more in the first round than he did in 2005 (19.1%). Karroubi’s numbers in his provinces of strength were better, with polling regularly put him at around 20-25% in his home region, with particular strength in the provinces of Lorestan, Ilam, and Khuzestan. This is where the provinicial results get fishy… Not only did Ahmadinejad beat Karroubi in his base of support, he crushed him beyond all recognition. Karroubi’s share of the vote in Lorestan was cleaved by a factor of ten, and in only two other of the provinces did he break above 1%. Even with a consolidation of conservative support, and possible defection of Karroubi supporters to Mousavi (who was likely perceived as the candidate more likely to win) this large of shift is hard to imagine.

The independent Tehran Bureau, which is one of the best sources of Iranian election coverage right now, also crunches some numbers and finds an almost constant linear relationship between Mousavi’s and Ahmadinejad’s share of the vote, district by district. Writer Muhammad Sahimi argues that this kind of relationship would be highly unlikely in any election—but especially so in Iran, where different electoral districts have vastly varying ethnic makeups. (His commenters dispute his methodology, however.)

Laura Secor, blogging for The New Yorker, offers her own “swift gut reaction” based on her reporting from Iran during three elections:

I was in Iran for the 2005 presidential election, the 2006 election for the Assembly of Experts and city councils, and the 2008 parliamentary elections. Nowhere did I see any kind of balloting other than old-fashioned paper. This is not the United States, where partial results appear on television screens on a rolling basis. The results were tabulated by hand, and, therefore, never released less than twenty-four hours after the polls closed. In 2005, the second-round results were issued in the wee hours of the second day after the voting. They were delivered by announcement outside the interior ministry, where die-hard political junkies and journalists had gathered since midday Saturday to await news. This time, the regime’s television station called Ahmadenijad the winner at 1:30 A.M. Saturday morning, only ninety minutes after the last polls closed, and the proportions had barely changed when the official announcement came nine-and-half hours later. How, exactly, did the government manage to tabulate the results so quickly?

A sort of pernicious cliché has entered our discussion of Iranian politics, namely that the Western press cannot be trusted because American reporters are too lazy to leave North Tehran and too dazzled by the appearance of a vocal minority of upper-class Iranians who are congenial to our self-image…

Class dynamics in Iran are volatile, complex, and absolutely integral to the country’s politics and history. But the simplistic gloss that all but an élite and trivial minority support the fundamentalist outlook, irresponsible populism, and strong-man politics of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does not begin to do them justice, let alone to illuminate the forces currently clashing in the streets of Iranian cities large and small.

Seen other good articles parsing Iran’s elections? Post your links in the comments.

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Kathy Gilsinan is the associate editor at World Politics Review