When the late Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense for presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, commissioned a group of “defense intellectuals” in the late 1960s to create a sober, thoughtful study of the evolution of one of America’s worst foreign policy blunders, the Pentagon Papers—forty-seven volumes, in all their greyness—were intended as good reading, perhaps, in the 1990s or later. What the country got instead, beginning on June 13, 1971, just as President Richard M. Nixon’s paranoia was building, was the sudden release of most of this material in The New York Times, then The Washington Post and elsewhere, revealing a sorry bipartisan history of lies and deception. This resulted in an epic court battle between the government and the press and, beginning a year later, the wild and unpredictable criminal trial—under the Espionage Act, among other statutes—of the main protagonist, former Pentagon official Daniel Ellsberg, who had leaked the Papers.
The Nixon administration was caught unawares by the revelations in the Papers, and went on an unseemly chase to figure out what the documents were, where they had come from, and how to control the presumed damage from their release. The panic was particularly poignant at the time because then-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was engaged in secret negotiations to open a relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China; he feared that Mao Zedong and Chou En-lai would suspend talks with a government that couldn’t keep delicate matters confidential. He persuaded Nixon and his attorney general, John N. Mitchell, to go to court against the newspapers and seek a prior restraint on further publication. Kissinger, incredibly, dubbed Ellsberg “the most dangerous man in America” (the convenient title of a 2010 Oscar-nominated biopic that has been given new relevance, and more widespread screenings, by the WikiLeaks affair).
The pretext, of course, was national security—that continued exposure of details from a study officially classified “top secret” would do irreparable harm to the United States and its forces in Southeast Asia. Never mind that the Times had locked up an elite group of reporters and editors in a hotel suite for months to review the documents and compare what was already on the public record, in order to determine what was notable and worthy of public attention without putting the country or its troops at risk. In the context of an increasingly bitter atmosphere between Nixon and his critics—Vice President Spiro Agnew was routinely drawing cheers at the time with his attacks on the “nattering nabobs of negativism,” and reporters were being hauled before grand juries and told to reveal their sources about the Black Panther Party and other controversial topics or risk imprisonment—there were political points to be scored by pursuing the newspapers.
The pursuit was intense and, with the benefit of hindsight, sometimes absurd. During one closed hearing in US District Court in Washington, when the late Judge Gerhard Gesell was to determine what in the Papers might be dangerous if revealed, representatives of Nixon’s Justice Department insisted that the courtroom doors be locked and brown paper taped over their small windows, lest the reporters lurking in the hallway be able to learn new secrets by looking in and reading lips. Appellate court deliberations went into the night, and presses were stopped awaiting the outcome.
For all its months in court, the government was never able to prove the slightest harm to national security as a result of the Pentagon Papers’ disclosure. On the contrary, it is clear that the publication of the Pentagon Papers was immensely valuable as a contribution to the public dialogue about the Vietnam War. It did not end the conflict overnight, as Ellsberg might have hoped, but it certainly made opposition to it more acceptable and understandable.
History, Off Limits
It would be encouraging to believe that the government has learned important lessons from the Pentagon Papers case and other, less celebrated ones since then. But in fact the problem of secrecy and the inappropriate classification of information valuable to the public has grown dramatically in recent decades.

At the risk of sounding like an intelligence community apologist, it stikes me that discussions of the FOIA and Wikileaks tend to miss elements that would provide a better picture of what's in play.
It's probably a safe bet to assume that, more often than not, the reason government documents are routinely classified is not because of whatever facts are revealed in the content, but instead because revealing such information is considered to provide insight into how the information was gathered, and the capabilities of those who gather it. A difference between process and product. The fact, for example, that Qaddafi prefers blond nurses doesn't really matter; how that becomes known does.
A separate issue is that if the government's allegations are true, Julian Assange and Bradley Manning have done the metaphorical equivalent of walking up and kicking a sleeping bear. What seems curious is the current widespread surprise and outrage because the bear woke up, and reacted by doing what bears do. It also makes you wonder: if the bear doesn't react, what does it say about the bear?
#1 Posted by Perry Gaskill, CJR on Fri 11 Mar 2011 at 10:03 PM
As a prior military communications and crypto technician for two branches of military in the 1960's, I have little sympathy, and no admiration for Bradley Manning. On the other hand, I have a grudging respect for Julian Assange.
Even in the '60's unnecessary classification was the rule, for example, missing ordinance inventory was classified Secret. Why? The only possible reason would be to keep the citizens of the U.S. from knowing how many weapons and how much ammunition, paid for by the taxpayers, had now "escaped" and was in the hands of who?
There were Secret communications about bombing results in North Viet Nam. Why? Did the North Vietnamese communists not know what had been bombed, and how badly in the prior 24 hours?
However, the vast majority of the Wikileaks "cables" which I have read would have been Unclassified, though they might have passed point-to-point over encrypted networks. The government encrypted everything on radio and teletype as a precaution against an administrative error putting a Classified document on an unprotected circuit.
As a military security worker, Mr. Manning had an obligation to his covenant with his government. Mr. Assange has no such obligation.
#2 Posted by BK, CJR on Sat 12 Mar 2011 at 12:52 AM