The book even includes glimpses into the thoughts of various big shots. Want to know what Tim Geithner was thinking during a particularly tense 6 a.m. jog along the river in lower Manhattan?
This is what it was all about, he thought to himself, the people who rise at dawn to get in to their jobs, all of whom rely to some extent on the financial industry to help power the economy. Never mind the staggering numbers. Never mind the ruthless complexity of structured finance and derivatives, nor the million-dollar bonuses of those who made bad bets. This is what the saving the financial industry is really about, he reminded himself, protecting ordinary people with ordinary jobs.
Okay, so not all anecdotes are created equal. And yes, the book is packed with selective accounts of media-savvy individuals bent on preserving their reputations—no surprise, in a work that relies so heavily on access to private conversations and thoughts.
The book’s ultimate value is the window it provides into how leading figures of the financial system behaved under the pressure of the greatest professional crisis of their lives, and the role played by ego and face-saving during those historic times. We knew that things in the final months were chaotic and out of control. What Sorkin illustrates, and in vivid journalistic detail, is the madcap confusion as frantic government officials try to engineer one merger after another between longstanding rivals while trying to avoid the appearance of doing just that. This leads to some real voyeuristic pleasures. In one memorable passage, Geithner plays matchmaker with Lehman’s Dick Fuld and Barclay’s Bob Diamond:
“He knows you’ll be calling,” Geithner assured [Fuld]. “I understand I’m supposed to call you,” Fuld said when he later reached Diamond. Diamond, however, was clearly flustered, as he thought he had been explicit with Geithner that he didn’t want to talk directly to Fuld about a deal. A deal would have to be brokered by the U.S. government. “I think we should talk,” Fuld said, trying to engage with him. “I don’t see an opportunity for us here,” Diamond answered.
Such scenes, which evoke Harold Pinter or maybe Abbott and Costello, are thick on the ground in TBTF. They are its reason for being.
What readers should not expect is an exploration of the roots of the financial crisis, primers on synthetic collateralized debt obligations, ruminations on the nature of greed, muckraking, moralizing, or thumbsucking of any kind. Any historical context here exists simply to get readers to the next tense conversation in the next glamorous location (the St. Regis, Sun Valley, Dick Fuld’s limo, and so on).
When Sorkin does take a step back from his fly-on-the-wall reportage, his analysis and conclusions are unoriginal and middle of the road. The prose is pure newspaper-ese (“Wearing one of his trademark off-the-rack, no-fuss suits and tortoise-rimmed glasses, Buffett. . . .”). There are no characters to speak of. The protagonists are mostly stick figures, square-jawed types running around with their hair on fire, uttering dialogue straight out of an action movie. Three specimens should give you the idea:
McGee shot a nervous glance at McDade, as if to say, “We’re fucked.”
For fuck’s sake, Wilkinson thought.
“Why didn’t we know this earlier? This is fucking crazy.”
Basically, TBTF is the 24 of financial-crisis books. The world is about to blow up, and everybody is Jack Bauer. Interestingly, the only figure to emerge with at least a shred of personality is Dick Fuld. Sorkin has assembled so much material on the Lehman lifer that the reader is able to witness the unraveling of his personality as months of stress and sleepless nights take their toll. After a while, the only person who doesn’t know he’s finished as CEO of Lehman is Fuld himself. This, Sorkin makes clear, is a man who has sat through one too many conference calls:
“Look into the whites of my eyes,” he said. “There isn’t enough room for both of us at the top here. We both know that.” He paused and stared at Diamond intently. “I’m willing to step aside to make this work for the firm.”

Whine whine whine. Columbia keeps turning out mediocre reporters, and Starkman keeps picking nits and finding fault with everything. If I want sanctimony I'll go to church.
#1 Posted by L. Lloyd Samuels, CJR on Thu 11 Mar 2010 at 03:55 PM
A "once-in-a-generation journalist"?
I think I just threw up a little.
#2 Posted by Richard, CJR on Thu 11 Mar 2010 at 04:19 PM
At least it's better than Gasparino's book: no anecdotes, no analysis, only wind.
#3 Posted by Steve Klein, CJR on Thu 11 Mar 2010 at 04:30 PM
No news in the book? I should hope not. The author writes for a daily newspaper, you know. If he knows any news, that is where it should be found.
#4 Posted by Harry Eagar, CJR on Thu 11 Mar 2010 at 04:42 PM
Another inside story begins to sound like a yawn...The political undercurrents are what's important to grasp now and how it relates to rubbish talk like "to big to fail", and rubbish words like "derivatives" (yet to be clearly explained). Take pause and examine recent history, circa fascist Italy 1930's and 40',bailing out their plutocrats with public monies, arming the right and beating up the left ..all repeating itself during Seattle 1999 and the WTO; or the Greens, G20 in Pennsylvania. Police riot gear on full display, in use, shows to all of us what IS ongoing and what IS perfectly clear, government riot control against a fed up nation!.
#5 Posted by elmer fuddieee, CJR on Fri 12 Mar 2010 at 12:45 AM
This review captures what I've been telling everyone abut TBTF. It serves up the gossip of the crisis and never gets near the bone.
#6 Posted by Michael M. Thomas, CJR on Fri 12 Mar 2010 at 08:50 AM
This review reminds me of a review of a book on great hitters in baseball, that pointed how how it never talked about how the uniforms were made.
#7 Posted by J Scott Brown, CJR on Fri 12 Mar 2010 at 10:25 AM
I read TBTF with great interest and anticipation, and agree 100% with this assessment. It's great read. Great job of reporting. But I didn't feel after 600 pages that it added much to our understanding of the causes of the crisis, or its significance.
#8 Posted by Marc Gunther, CJR on Fri 12 Mar 2010 at 02:15 PM
It's a great fictional narrative that plays well with our modern times. Great journalism? Far from it. Sorkin is an insider and he shows why. With recent revelations about Leahman's repo transactions, Sorkin's book was exposed for what it is--a gloss over of the biggest heist in American financial hsitory. He made Fuld look like an angel. I understand the reasoning. As a journalist he wants to maintain his access to these people. Pragmatic? Sure. Cynical? Absolutely. But this is not journalism. I don't know what values/Ethics you teach at Columbia.
#9 Posted by Martin dugard, CJR on Sun 14 Mar 2010 at 12:30 PM
Richard, you are right about the nausea, I got it too.
Great review of a book that follows the crumbs dribbled by those who lead and feed the GFC. I suspect Sorkin is not up to a sequel, highlighting the options to avoid this tendency of Wall St Institutions to drive the economy off the top of the cliff with the Leeming like acquiescence of Regulators and Politicians. The end result of course is that the non participants in this game of fraud are the ones to suffer.
#10 Posted by Anechidna, CJR on Fri 19 Mar 2010 at 05:00 PM
I don't think it is fair criticism to complain that Sorkin wrote the wrong book. No one book could cover both the events of mid-to-late 2008 and get into depth about root causes. That would be 2000-pager that ordinary human beings couldn't even lift, let alone read.
If he got facts wrong, if he misrepresented reality, then have at it. But unless you are his assignment editor, his choice of topics is his call not yours.
#11 Posted by garhighway, CJR on Mon 23 Aug 2010 at 10:18 AM