The London Review of Books has a fascinating piece by the Bank of England’s Andrew Haldane on excessive financial-industry risk. He looks back at the history of the British financial system to help shed light on our modern-day troubles.
Until the late 19th century, Britain’s banks were all unlimited-liability companies, meaning owners were on the hook for all losses, and limiting their appetite for unnecessary risk. And until the early 20th century, most banks there had extended-liability, which put owners on the hook for a fixed amount of losses over and above their investments. Now, they’re all limited-liability corporations:
What impact did these changes have on banks’ incentive to take risks? The answer was provided in 1974, around a hundred years after the introduction of limited liability, by the Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Merton, who showed that the equity of a limited liability company could be valued as if it were a financial option - that is, an instrument which offers rights over the future fruits of the company’s assets. This option has value - in the jargon, it is ‘in the money’ - provided a firm’s assets cover its debts. But the most extraordinary implication of Merton’s framework is that the value of those options can be enhanced by increases in the degree of uncertainty about the value of the bank’s assets. How so? Because while uncertainty increases both upside and downside risks, downside risks are capped by limited liability. For shareholders, the sky is the limit but the floor is always just beneath their feet. To maximise shareholder value, therefore, banks need simply to seek bigger and riskier bets.
The response to these incentives has been entirely predictable. Since 1880, the ratio of UK bank assets to GDP has risen roughly tenfold, and the increase has been particularly steep over the past thirty years, peaking at well over 500 per cent of GDP. The pattern in other developed countries has been similar, if less dramatic. The bets weren’t just bigger, but also riskier. During the 20th century, an alphabet soup of exotic and complex instruments, often known by three-letter acronyms, came to displace simple loans on banks’ balance sheets. These boosted banks’ returns. But if returns are high, risks are never far behind. Returns on bank assets were two and a half times more volatile at the end of the 20th century than at the beginning…
The evolution of banking as I have described it has satisfied the immediate demands of shareholders and managers, but has short-changed everyone else. There is a compelling case for policy intervention. The best proposals for reform are those which aim to reshape risk-taking incentives on a durable basis. Perhaps the most obvious way to tackle shareholder-led incentive problems is to increase banks’ equity capital base. This directly reduces their leverage and therefore the scale of the risks they can take. And it increases banks’ capacity to absorb losses, reducing the need for taxpayer intervention.
And of course, as Haldane notes, Too Big to Fail is just another way of limiting liability.
— In the wake of The New York Times disturbing iEconomy series on working conditions at Apple’s outsourced factories, the company commissioned a workplace monitor to inspect them.
The Fair Labor Association, a watchdog monitoring working conditions at makers of Apple Inc. products, has uncovered “tons of issues” that need to be addressed at a Foxconn Technology Group plant in Shenzhen, China, FLA Chief Executive Officer Auret van Heerden said.
Van Heerden made the comments in a telephone interview after a multiday inspection of the factory. Apple, the first technology company to join the FLA, said on Feb. 13 that it asked the Washington-based nonprofit organization to inspect plants owned by three of its largest manufacturing partners.
“We’re finding tons of issues,” van Heerden said en route to a meeting where FLA inspectors were scheduled to present preliminary findings to Foxconn management. “I believe we’re going to see some very significant announcements in the near future.”
— The scope of the foreclosure scandal is astonishing.

dday at the fire dog news desk has been atop this story and it really becomes an indictment of the Obama justice department quickly:
http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/02/16/san-francisco-assessor-recorder-phil-ting-finds-widespread-mortgage-document-fraud/
"It’s incredible to me how the smallest players could so quickly uncover evidence of foreclosure fraud, and the large institutional regulators choose not to even try. Registers of deeds and county recorders like Ting, Jeff Thigpen and John O’Brien have done more investigative work than most federal agencies. Abigail Field, a freelance reporter working for Fortune, did more by going to the local courthouse and finding that Countrywide did not properly engage in the securitization process of sending notes to trusts than practically any Attorney General. As Adam Levitin says, this shows that the only barrier to a real investigation of the mortgage industry is will."
Or, more accurately, 'won't'. They don't want to trouble the fat cats from whom donations are flowing 5 to 1 to republicans, and that ain't counting the superpacs.
But it gets worse, in a rush to release details of a settlement before the State of the Union, Obama released the details of a deal (and the AG's who had signed on) before making the bloody deal. The banks now have leverage over the deal since the justice departments on a state and federal level have been stupidly committed to it. This is while new information has been coming out.
http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/02/20/pelosi-calls-on-holder-to-follow-up-on-phil-ting-mortgage-document-fraud-study/
"The report, based on a review of a random sample of mortgage loans that entered into foreclosure between January 2009 and October 2011, found that 99 percent of the San Francisco mortgages reviewed showed irregularities in the foreclosure process, and 84 percent showed potential violations of California non-judicial foreclosure laws."
I should be surprised by this stuff, but, for some time, I've lacked the ability.
#1 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Mon 20 Feb 2012 at 01:42 PM
More on the 'Let's make a not final deal!' deal:
http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/02/20/the-robo-signed-foreclosure-fraud-settlement/
#2 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Mon 20 Feb 2012 at 01:51 PM
What is never addressed here in Chittumland?
The cost to society of ignoring mortgage defaults.
Yes, the lenders should do things right. But so should borrowers.
The root cause of the problem is that borrowers aren't making payments. Ryan and his leftist comrades in arms (who can no longer be called "commies" under Pravda's... er, I mean CJR's new comment censorship policy) consistently and dogmatically ignore this little truism.
Forcing lenders to eat to absorb defaults will have a profound and obviously detrimental effect on the availability of credit. Who is going to lend money if collection isn't possible?
The lefties want to hold the lenders feet to the fire by requiring technical compliance with each and every one of the the many procedures required to foreclose... And this is fine. I agree that this should be done. But there needs to be a fair and equitable means of dealing with clerical and record keeping problems that protects lenders.
In the end, we are talking about the lender's money be taken by borrowers without repayment. That's the REALITY here.
What about the borrowers who lied to get mortgages (and there were MILLIONS of them)? Why should they get a free pass?
And what about the defaults? Are lenders supposed to eat loan payments because a form wasn't signed properly? For real? Borrowers get free houses due to clerical errors?
Enforcing such a patently unjust policy will obviously discourage lenders from writing mortgages. Is this the leftie objective? How does this benefit society?
#3 Posted by padikiller, CJR on Mon 20 Feb 2012 at 02:21 PM
"In the end, we are talking about the lender's money be taken by borrowers without repayment. That's the REALITY here."
You see, this is the root of many a major misunderstanding. A large part of the money was not the lender's, that idea belongs to the old presecuritzation mortgage model. The money belonged to investors which meant for the banks there was money to be made in the quantity of product, not the quality. It wasn't bank money at risk, they were the middle man collecting bonuses and making bets.
Therefore the lenders should be liable to borrowers, for their shoddy document work in creating the product, and the investors for their shoddy product. The middle man banks were charged with making repayable loans loaned on non-fraudulent terms based on non-fraudulent asset appraisals chained together by documents so that the claims by all parties can be legally established.
The banks did not do this. In any other setting, if a claim cannot be established, then the claim cannot be recognized in court. That is why we have contracts. If the banks lost these contracts then it should be a sad day for them. They chose not to file contracts the usual way with municipalities so they could save millions in fees. They don't get to hire teenagers to forge borrower details on the paper work they lost so they can foreclose on them. You don't get to toss these loosely documented and falsely appraised assets at investors and say 'My work is done.' the people who advocate for that do not believe in equal protection under the law.
http://rortybomb.wordpress.com/2011/10/31/halloween-costumes-foreclosures-creditors-bargains-and-how-the-1-view-our-laws-on-debt/
"Banks, by not following the trust and REMIC laws that constitute the securitization process, aren’t the ones undermining the process in which banks can legally bring foreclosures to court, and thus the concept of a mortgage. The states, and ultimately the homeowners, are undermining it by pointing out that the banks haven’t followed the rules. This comment is consistent with the idea that the only reason to have laws is to protect creditors from debtors...
In this world, debtors probably could challenge the legality of their foreclosures, making sure proper procedure was followed. But that’s not what the rules are meant to do...when it comes to the idea that all these mortgages are unsecured debt because of bank-led abuses in the chain of property records, they get angry at debtors, even though they are still holders of contracts. But again, if the law is just there to protect creditors against the difficulty of collecting on debtors, not to provide a level playing field for those with debt, it makes perfect sense."
If a borrower signs a document containing conditions differing from the ones he was orally promised, it's a sad day for the borrower who did not excercise due diligence. If the lender loses those documents after the borrower defaults on payments he could not possibly make, then it's the borrower's problem again?
Under the Padi system, not only are we rewarding banks for oral fraud, we're also rewarding them for not being diligent underwriters and record keepers.
Why are we rewarding bad bankers?
#4 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Mon 20 Feb 2012 at 06:45 PM
Screw the bankers. It worked in Argentina, it works in Iceland:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-20/icelandic-anger-brings-record-debt-relief-in-best-crisis-recovery-story.html
"Since the end of 2008, the island’s banks have forgiven loans equivalent to 13 percent of gross domestic product, easing the debt burdens of more than a quarter of the population, according to a report published this month by the Icelandic Financial Services Association.
“You could safely say that Iceland holds the world record in household debt relief,” said Lars Christensen, chief emerging markets economist at Danske Bank A/S in Copenhagen. “Iceland followed the textbook example of what is required in a crisis. Any economist would agree with that.”
The island’s steps to resurrect itself since 2008, when its banks defaulted on $85 billion, are proving effective. Iceland’s economy will this year outgrow the euro area and the developed world on average, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates...
The island’s households were helped by an agreement between the government and the banks, which are still partly controlled by the state, to forgive debt exceeding 110 percent of home values. On top of that, a Supreme Court ruling in June 2010 found loans indexed to foreign currencies were illegal, meaning households no longer need to cover krona losses...
Iceland’s special prosecutor has said it may indict as many as 90 people, while more than 200, including the former chief executives at the three biggest banks, face criminal charges...
That compares with the U.S., where no top bank executives have faced criminal prosecution for their roles in the subprime mortgage meltdown. The Securities and Exchange Commission said last year it had sanctioned 39 senior officers for conduct related to the housing market meltdown."
'Oh but Thimbles, what about moral hazard!?!111
#5 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Mon 20 Feb 2012 at 08:33 PM
"Or, more accurately, 'won't'. They don't want to trouble the fat cats from whom donations are flowing 5 to 1 to republicans, and that ain't counting the superpacs."
http://motherjones.com/mojo/2012/02/historic-price-cost-presidential-elections
"We'll see if these trends hold; 2012 could beat all records for campaign spending—and that's not counting super-PAC money."
#6 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Mon 20 Feb 2012 at 09:49 PM
Thimbles: Screw the banks.
As Thimbles notes, the "banks" are the shareholders. Pension funds. Investment funds. Etc. Money in your grandma's IRA. You kid's teacher's pension fund. Etc.
Under what sense of justice is it fair to let borrowers take money from investors due to clerical errors?
I'm not talking about fraud in loan terms. I've made it clear that I believe that lenders who committed fraud should be prosecuted. I'm talking about failing to file a deed in the right office, failing to check a box, misfiling a loan document, etc. Why should a clerical error result in free real estate?
And, though Thimbles dodged the issue, what about the fraud committed by borrowers?
#7 Posted by padikiller, CJR on Tue 21 Feb 2012 at 07:42 AM
It is the business of banks to catch fraud by borrowers. If it is the borrowers' business to check their contracts for terms that will bankrupt them before signing, and it's bad on borrowers for signing a document without doing so, then bank's who do not check their loan applicants deserve to suffer, if not go bankrupt.
We need to put the people who made these loans out on the street. Assuming they're honest, they are still horrible at their jobs.
Now when you get elements of fraud surfacing in the 60-70-80% range, assuming the banks were honest takes a lot of gullibility. 80% of people are not dishonest about their financial statements. The few percent who are take up the few percent of loans that make up borrower instigated fraud.
In borrower instigated fraud, we should not see problems with the documents since the bank should have been the honest and competent agent and the borrower would have been the fraud.
The frequency rates and the document patterns do not add up to MILLIONS of borrower instigated fraud. This was lender, appraiser, securitizer, rater fraud. The whole system was corrupted by compensation practices which reward corruption and risk accumulation.
Those who committed fraud should go to jail. Borrowers who have committed fraud have been going to jail.
Where are the lenders? Oh, they get immunity agreements, pay fines which are a percent of the profit, admit no guilt, and walk.
That is not justice.
"As Thimbles notes, the "banks" are the shareholders. Pension funds. Investment funds. Etc. Money in your grandma's IRA. You kid's teacher's pension fund."
Wrong. In the cases where bank shareholders are pension funds etc.. they deserve to be wiped out for allowing their officers to engage in such stupid and destructive practices.
But that is not we are talking about here. What we are talking about is the securities banks sold to pension funds etc... under the promise that these securities were safe. The banks knew they were not, they bet against their own products and talked about what sh*t they were in emails. FRAUD.
We're talking about investors who bought securities from banks, not investors who own banks. Show me where I used the word 'shareholder'. Don't insert words into my posts unless you want to admit you lack the reading comprehension to understand them.
"I'm talking about failing to file a deed in the right office, failing to check a box, misfiling a loan document, etc. Why should a clerical error result in free real estate?"
Because if that is the law, then that is the law. If banks know that not having documents will negate their claims to an asset, then they'd damn well better make sure they can retrieve those documents. When you start fudging the details of property law, then you break down the property system - you get multiple banks claiming the same asset, attempts to foreclose properties without a mortgage, debts without a known mortgage servicer, etc...
If clerical errors do not result in severe consequences, then banks won't take care not to make them. They will cut costs, trim staff, forget to file documents, etc.. and that's assuming they are not riddled with fraud.
Banks are entrusted with a serious responsibility, allocating capital in ways that produce gains for investors and for borrowers. If they prove unworthy of that trust, the consequences must be dire. Banks today get their motivation from today's bonuses predicated on tomorrow's crash. Under what sense of justice should we allow that to continue?
#8 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Tue 21 Feb 2012 at 01:58 PM
Who (besides you) says it's the banks' job to police borrowers? This is silly. If I lie to you to get credit, who is the victim?
The notion that borrowers are entitled to free money or real estate because of honest clerical mistakes is a patently absurd and unjust one.
Furthermore, you are flat out wrong about the effect of this type of commie Robin Hood redistribution on shareholders. For example, looking at the largest bank, the FACT of the matter is that institutional investors hold more than half of BoA stock.
Dumping the cost of honest mistakes on shareholders will end up hurting retirees, college funds, and the working capital of small business owners.
#9 Posted by padikiller, CJR on Tue 21 Feb 2012 at 03:10 PM
"Who (besides you) says it's the banks' job to police borrowers? This is silly. If I lie to you to get credit, who is the victim?"
Actual quote:"It is the business of banks to catch fraud by borrowers."
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v5vzCmURh7o
Do banks no longer have the duty to verify the information of the people to whom they lend money? Seriously?
Yet another stupid conversation concludes with padington bear.
#10 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Tue 21 Feb 2012 at 04:23 PM
Worth a read:
http://www.neweconomicperspectives.org/2012/02/amazing-vanishing-act-accounting.html
"On January 17, 1996, OTS’ Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposed to eliminate its rule requiring effective underwriting on the grounds that such rules were peripheral to bank safety.
“The OTS believes that regulations should be reserved for core safety and soundness requirements. Details on prudent operating practices should be relegated to guidance.
Otherwise, regulated entities can find themselves unable to respond to market innovations because they are trapped in a rigid regulatory framework developed in accordance with conditions prevailing at an earlier time.”
This passage is delusional. Underwriting is the core function of a mortgage lender. Not underwriting mortgage loans is not an “innovation” – it is a “marker” of accounting control fraud. The OTS press release dismissed the agency’s most important and useful rule as an archaic relic of a failed philosophy.
"By getting away from 'cookie cutter' and 'one size fits all' regulations, we're giving thrifts more flexibility to tailor their operations to better meet the needs of their customers," said John Downey, executive director, Supervision. "Enhancing flexibility and reducing paperwork will hopefully make the lending process easier for both savings institutions and their customers," he noted.
"We believe we can simplify our rules and give thrift management more flexibility without jeopardizing the safety and soundness of thrifts' lending and investing operations," said Carolyn Buck, OTS chief counsel. "We are eliminating numerous picky details from the regulations, while leaving fundamental safety and soundness constraints in place," she said.
The OTS underwriting rules imposed the minimum, not the optimal, underwriting processes that a prudent lender would follow. It imposed no costs on honest lenders. Any prudent lender should have done considerably more than was required under the rules...
OTS Acting Director Fiechter was happy to deliver an anti-regulatory policy that he substantively supported.
“In summary, after the lifting of statutory requirements for mortgage loans in 1982, regulatory requirements were lifted as well. The federal regulators relied on bank management to ensure sound operations, and on consumers to protect themselves against abusive loan practices [p. 161].
Regulators expected that market-based decisions would lead to innovative loan products, which would maximize availability of credit and which practices. Lender self-interest, bounded by the legal mandate of “safety and soundness,” was relied upon to ensure safe offerings. Consumer self-interest was also relied upon to weed out unsafe products and practices [p. 163, footnotes omitted].”...
In 1993, the federal financial regulatory agencies adopted an interagency rule junking their loan underwriting rules and substituting deliberately unenforceable guidelines...
The industry, however, had a practical concern. OTS still had many examiners who knew that the guidelines were “bound to produce looting.” The danger was that the examiners would try to make the guidelines effective. The OTS, therefore, assured the industry that it would make sure it would not allow such an act...
As late as 2004, the OTS examination guide provided this warning and mandate about inadequate records. Of course, the agency’s leadership no longer supported the guidance. Given what we know about the endemic nature of record deficiencies in the loan origination and foreclosure contexts, consider how harmful anti-regulatory leaders are...
The federal banking agencies’ anti-regulatory leaders and economists drummed into their staff the fictional claim that “basic economic theory” and “common sense” p
#11 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Wed 22 Feb 2012 at 03:12 PM
Geez, I was under 600 according to the counter thing:
"The federal banking agencies’ anti-regulatory leaders and economists drummed into their staff the fictional claim that “basic economic theory” and “common sense” proved that the CEO would never lead an accounting control fraud. The regulatory agencies, therefore, made zero criminal referrals against the massive frauds that specialized in making liar’s loans – loans that the lenders’ CEOs did not expect to be repaid. We are left with the myth of the Virgin Crisis, conceived without sin."
Basically we're going back to Greenspan's flaw, where Greenspan refused to recognize fraud because banks should not defraud themselves nor their clients. It's a 'self-interest' objection.
However, the people who work for banks are not the banks, therefore their self interest is not going to be the bank's self interest especially if they can earn a lifetime's worth of income in a couple of year's worth of bonuses earned through practices which are guaranteed to harm the bank and its clients. It's a pretty simple picture to see, compensation for harm done coupled with penalty for harm absent == systemic crime cultured. Oh look! Another crash!
Is our stupidity limited enough to learn a lesson from this?
#12 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Wed 22 Feb 2012 at 03:31 PM
Good ol Johnny Cochrane.
'The banks are being mistreated by this awful sweetheart deal giving them immunity from the law for a small price of the damage they caused.'
Or as he put it in 'racy' terms:
http://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2012/02/fed-independence-2025.html
"How long will it be until the Fed starts acting like the Administration. "Nice bank you have there. Wouldn't want anything to happen to it. Those consumer financial protection nerds can be a real pain in the butt, can't they? To say nothing of those wonks down in the systemic risk department. Say, we notice you're still sitting on a lot of reserves, and nobody's lending to support the housing market in Detroit. Sure would be nice if you pitched in and helped a bit. And why aren't you writing down mortgages instead of foreclosing on all those houses?""
Yeah, jerk, why don't you tell us how long it will be before Bernanke starts acting like one of those black boys from Chicago?
But yeah, the important bit is here:
http://rortybomb.wordpress.com/2012/02/22/cochrane-sees-moral-hazard-only-in-one-direction/
"Why does Cochrane feel something has gone terribly wrong? Here’s a quick scan:
Led by the White House, the state Attorneys General announced their “settlement” with banks….There are also costs. This money comes from somewhere…To say nothing of the blatant unfairness, and moral hazard…or the larger moral hazard of using the threat of prosecution for procedural errors to force anyone to cough up money towards unrelated policy goals…
Heavens, what a scandal…Documents not properly notarized! Notice it does not even “allege” that anyone was actually kicked out of a house who was paying their mortgage.
I once got into a disagreement with someone over whether or not libertarians care about fraud. I alleged they didn’t, and their real concerns would always run downhill, usually towards debtors. They have no language for fraud other than a reactionary posture that going after fraud unfairly benefits those on the other end, who have gotten what they deserved.
Look at Cochrane’s post – the robosigning and subsequent scandals are viewed as nothing of significance. Not only are these acts against the law, but not breaking these laws are essential to the whole securitization chain. Following the proper legal steps in creating and executing these financial instruments is necessary for the whole thing to work. From REMIC to trust to property law to bankruptcy remoteness to everything else, unless you are actually following these steps you are causing huge problems for the securitization later on. The same goes for foreclosures. Like all property, they are legal creations. And for a particularly complex piece of property like a security composed of many home mortgages, following the law is essential.
Allowing financial firms to get away with not following the laws we created to handle securitization, property and foreclosure would, in any sensible sense of the phrase, cause “moral hazard.” But the only moral hazard Cochrane is concerned about is ones that might benefit mortgage debtors, who need to be constantly disciplined. Two sets of rules – one for the 1%, one for everyone else."
Where is the justice?
#13 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Fri 24 Feb 2012 at 05:07 PM