The top story in The Wall Street Journal today is interesting for what it says about how American papers are more willing to call it like they see it when they’re writing outside the U.S.
The piece focuses on new signs of a looming recession in Europe. What’s interesting is how the paper explains why the Eurozone economy is faltering (emphasis mine):
The risk of recession in the euro zone is mounting, according to a closely watched business survey, signalling that a vicious cycle of fiscal austerity and economic contraction threatens even some of Europe’s biggest economies.
A few paragraphs later:
The worsening outlook could force France’s government to make deeper budget cuts to protect its triple-A credit rating, further hurting its economy and adding to doubts about Europe’s ability to pay for bailouts of the euro’s weakest members.
What the Journal is telling us by writing it this way, without attribution, is that it’s an accepted and/or empirical fact (or about as close as economics gets to one) that cutting government spending in a weak economy hurts the economy. And that’s true.
But the political debate, and thus news coverage, in the U.S. over the last couple of years has been disproportionately focused on deficit issues, with jobs (read: spending) on the backburner. If you got the impression, much less saw the direct assertion, from all this coverage that cuts would hurt the economy, then we must not have been reading the same stories.
Just a couple months ago the big issue here was whether the Tea Party wing of the Republican Party would deign to raise the government’s debt ceiling. The Journal profiled Michele Bachmann on page one around that time, reporting this:
Ms. Bachmann had said for weeks she would oppose any increase in the borrowing limit, no matter how much budget-cutting might accompany it.
The paper did a good job calling out some of Bachmann’s other false statements, but it left this unhinged position, which is as contractionary as anything being done or even contemplated in Europe, unchallenged.
The Journal wrote 1,800 words on how deficit cuts are likely to affect the middle class, but didn’t mention the contractionary pressures that would put on the economy.
So why does today’s story read so differently than the news stories we saw during the debate over austerity and deep budget cuts (much less whether to fund the government) in the U.S.? Is cutting government spending in Europe somehow contractionary while doing the same in the U.S. is not? I don’t think so.
This isn’t the first time the Journal has pointed to the steep economic downside of budget cuts overseas:
Two years into Greece’s debt crisis, its citizens are reeling from austerity measures imposed to prevent a government debt default that could cause havoc throughout Europe. The economic pain is the price Greece and Europe are paying to defend the euro, the centerpiece of 60 years of efforts to unite the Continent. But as Greece’s economy shrinks, its society is fraying, raising questions about how long Greeks will be able to take the strain.
The objective press sometimes has an easier time telling us how it really is when the subject is overseas and largely removed from domestic political considerations (the biggest exception to this would be the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which not coincidentally, is very much a domestic political consideration).
Why is that? Journalists here are often afraid of the bias police when writing (and editing) news stories on hot political issues. The he said-she said tendency is strong, even when it wrongly implies, as it often does, that each side has equal evidence.
So are there other issues that U.S. journalists cover more truthfully overseas than at home?
Well, for one, to our major newspapers, what’s “torture” overseas isn’t always that closer to home. A Harvard study found The New York Times called waterboarding torture 82 percent of the time from 1930 to 2004. After that, when the U.S. became the most famous waterboarder, the Times called it torture 1 percent of the time.
Not so objective, after all.
Why is that? Journalists here are often afraid of the bias police when writing (and editing) news stories on hot political issues. The he said-she said tendency is strong, even when it wrongly implies, as it often does, that each side has equal evidence.
Equal evidence pertaining to what? Is anyone arguing that “austerity” in the United States or anywhere for that matter won’t lead to some short term downturn and pain? The aim of “austerity” is to stabilize debt, not provide stimulus. Unless you feel deficits of 8%-10% of GDP for the foreseeable future are sustainable, there really isn’t much of a choice. “Austerity” is a choice between bad now or bankruptcy later. Short term pain or long term catastrophe.
Maybe you just think we should ">http://seekingalpha.com/article/262724-defaulting-on-debt-is-not-the-end-of-the-world"> follow your buddy Dean Baker’s advice and default now. Better yet, being in the media business, you could always help Paul Krugman whip up his phony alien invasion.
#1 Posted by Mike H, CJR on Tue 25 Oct 2011 at 03:27 PM
Speaking of Harvard studies...
Here's one for you:
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/alesina/files/Large%2Bchanges%2Bin%2Bfiscal%2Bpolicy_October_2009.pdf
"Fiscal stimuli based upon tax cuts are more likely to increase growth than those based upon spending increases. As for fiscal adjustments those based upon spending cuts and no tax increases are more likely to reduce deficits and debt over GDP ratios than those based upon tax increases. In addition, adjustments on the spending side rather than on the tax side are less likely to create recessions. We confirm these results with simple regression analysis"
#2 Posted by padikiller, CJR on Tue 25 Oct 2011 at 07:14 PM
"Journalists here are often afraid of the bias police when writing (and editing) news stories on hot political issues."
I think there is an aspect of that, but I think there's also a tendency to see America as a different place where different rules apply. The American intellectuals (and the Obama Administration) have been advocating different policies for Europe then they have been taking for themselves because they have a different view of how the American economy is supposed to work.
And, unfortunately, journalists depend on these intellectuals and their think tanks for "objective reporting" sources. Thus the journalist asks the think tank American experts about American economic and political realities and gets one view. They ask these experts, or perhaps consult with different experts, on similar situations in Europe and get different views. So the question is, where are these bloody minded 'austerity experts' coming from?
As I pointed out many months ago the guys you have to watch out for are Rubin and Peterson and the think tanks they are running.
Ari Berman wrote a piece just recent like in the Nation:
http://www.thenation.com/article/164073/how-austerity-class-rules-washington
"The event spotlighted a central paradox in American politics over the past two years: how, in the midst of a massive unemployment crisis—when it’s painfully obvious that not enough jobs are being created and the public overwhelmingly wants policy-makers to focus on creating them—did the deficit emerge as the most pressing issue in the country? And why, when the global evidence clearly indicates that austerity measures will raise unemployment and hinder, not accelerate, growth, do advocates of austerity retain such distinction today?
An explanation can be found in the prominence of an influential and aggressive austerity class—an allegedly centrist coalition of politicians, wonks and pundits who are considered indisputably wise custodians of US economic policy. These “very serious people,” as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman wryly dubs them, have achieved what University of California, Berkeley, economist Brad DeLong calls “intellectual hegemony over the course of the debate in Washington, from 2009 until today.”
Its members include Wall Street titans like Pete Peterson and Robert Rubin; deficit-hawk groups like the CRFB, the Concord Coalition, the Hamilton Project, the Committee for Economic Development, Third Way and the Bipartisan Policy Center; budget wonks like Peter Orszag, Alice Rivlin, David Walker and Douglas Holtz-Eakin; red state Democrats in Congress like Mark Warner and Kent Conrad, the bipartisan “Gang of Six” and what’s left of the Blue Dog Coalition; influential pundits like Tom Friedman and David Brooks of the New York Times, Niall Ferguson and the Washington Post editorial page; and a parade of blue ribbon commissions, most notably Bowles-Simpson, whose members formed the all-star team of the austerity class..,
Taken together, the various strands of the austerity class form a reinforcing web that is difficult to break. Its think tanks and wonks produce a relentless stream of disturbing statistics warning of skyrocketing debt and looming bankruptcy, which in turn is trumpeted by politicians and the press and internalized by the public. Thus forms what Washington Post blogger Greg Sargent calls a Beltway Deficit Feedback Loop, wherein the hypothetical possibility of a US debt crisis somewhere in the future takes precedence over the very real jobs crisis now."
So these guys have a head lock on Washington debate, even during the great recession and 9% unemployment. This wouldn't be so bad if these people weren't idiots.
"Groups like the CRFB and the Con
#3 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Tue 25 Oct 2011 at 11:43 PM
"which in turn is trumpeted..."
"by politicians and the press and internalized by the public. Thus forms what Washington Post blogger Greg Sargent calls a Beltway Deficit Feedback Loop, wherein the hypothetical possibility of a US debt crisis somewhere in the future takes precedence over the very real jobs crisis now."
So these guys have a head lock on Washington debate, even during the great recession and 9% unemployment. This wouldn't be so bad if these people weren't idiots.
"Groups like the CRFB and the Concord Coalition, founded by former Congress members in the 1980s and ’90s, have long presented themselves as nonpartisan, penny-pinching critics of wasteful government spending, when really they are anti-government, pro-corporate ideologues whose boards are filled with K Street lobbyists and financial executives. The goal of much of the austerity class is to see government funds redirected to the private sector. (Their ideology, which accepts the accumulation of private debt but opposes government debt, explains why the austerity class ignored the massive housing and credit bubble, which more than any single factor contributed to an explosion of debt worldwide.)"
Or as James Galbraith put it in a response to David "the sky is falling" Walker:
"But did David Walker, Eugene Steuerle -- or Peter G. Peterson himself -- devote even five percent of the vast resources that they have lavished in recent years on the supposed "entitlement crisis" to warning about the impending mess on Wall Street?
Did they write anything about it? Did they speak out against the Bush administration's abandonment of supervisory responsibility in the financial system? Did they protest the massive abuse of unsophisticated home buyers by the loan originators in the subprime sector? Did they comment on "liars' loans," "neutron loans" and "toxic waste"? Were they heard about the risks involved in securitizing subprime loans? Did they foresee that credit default swaps could collapse like a house of cards? Did they caution that the stock market might crash, ruining the private retirements of millions of Americans?
If they did, I must have missed it.
Peter G. Peterson is one of the leading figures on Wall Street. Isn't it reasonable to ask, that if he and his team wish to be taken seriously on matters of public finance, that they should have shown some leadership, some wisdom, some insight and some foresight on the disaster brewing in their own backyard?
As the disaster on Wall Street developed, George Soros was heard from. Warren Buffett was heard from. Was Peter G. Peterson heard from? Was David Walker heard from? Was Eugene Steuerle heard from? I think they were not.
What is Mr. Walker's approach to subprime crisis today? His comment above makes his approach clear. It is to use the crisis as a rhetorical springboard, in order to divert the conversation back to what he calls the "super sub-prime crisis associated with the federal government's deteriorating finances"
These guys are either idiots or evil and the politicians/journalists who listen to them become dumber as a result. Why do they have so much power? I'm going to post on that subject tomorrow, but it has its roots in the Clinton Boom Economy - both global and domestic.
#4 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Wed 26 Oct 2011 at 12:08 AM
Rasafrasin 600 char..
"Why do they have so much power?"
I'm going to post on that subject tomorrow, but it has its roots in the Clinton Boom Economy - both global and domestic.
#5 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Wed 26 Oct 2011 at 12:15 AM
Two good books, one a bit better than the other, are good primers for why finance and government policy has gotten so separated from solid economics.
The Return of Depression Economics by Krugman (which is okay, but I disagree with him on a couple of points in his free trade constructions)
The Roaring Nineties by Stiglitz (which is a really good book about the inner workings of the Clinton Administration from an econ perspective)
And that second book is pretty much the description of the problem. As the old Moxy Fruvous song goes, many of the elites are Stuck in the Nineties again.
As Stiglitz wrote (p25):"We had principles. As the administration came into office, most of us knew what we were against. We were against Reagan conservatism. We knew that there needed to be a larger and different role for government, that we needed to be more concerned for the poor and for providing education and social protection for all, and we needed to protect the environoment. The shortsighted focus on finance, on the deficit, made us push this agenda aside."
The Clinton administration focused on deficit reduction in the wreckage of a financial crisis brought about by S&L deregulation. Stiglitz said (p41):"I've said, standard economics held that deficit reduction would slow down the recovery and increase unemployment... slower growth would lead to larger deficits."
So what happened? The US became the hub of a unipolar world after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but US conservatives did not offer that world stable leadership. They under collected revenues, overspent on defense, deregulated haphazardly and fought regulators who tried to restrain the criminals. They were untrusted.
When Clinton took over, the S&L situation was in the process of being resolved by good regulators and the economy was slowly recovering. The major fear was the inability of the federal government to deal with its "two santa claus" caused deficit. When Clinton attacked the deficit by raising taxes and cutting spending, it reduced the perception of risk which allowed American interest rates to fall and American currency to rise. International capital now had a place to park. Then came along Netscape and the economy rode the Silicon Valley wave.
What was the result? Stiglitz (p41): "Here, in a short span, we band of Clinton Economists, the so-called New Democrats, accomplished what the conservatives had for so long failed to do; for the economy did recover and deficit reduction was given the credit."
The theory became when bond holders have confidence, they put money in your banks, currency, and treasury and you can lower your interest rates.
The problem is you have to have preconditions in order for "deficit cutting to prosperity" to work. You have to have international capital ready to invest and willing to trade profitable interest for security; you have to be a central economy, not a periphery; and you have to have global economy to trade with so that while your government contracts the economy, international trade is expanding it.
More in a sec.
#6 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Wed 26 Oct 2011 at 12:31 PM
When the US tried to export this "model" to other countries (under what was called the Washington Consensus) it was disastrous.
This was because
a) the Consensus forced more radical (and unfair) versions on other countries than it accepted for itself. Stiglitz (p22) "Developing countries were told to open their markets to every imaginable form of import... Meanwhile, we maintained stiff barriers and large subsidies of our own on behalf of U.S. farmers and agribusiness, thereby denying our market to the farmers of the third world...At home, we defended our public Social Security against privatization... Abroad, we pushed privatization. At home, we argued the Fed should keep a focus on growth and unemployment... Abroad, we urged Central Banks to focus exclusively on inflation alone... Both through our own economic diplomacy, and through the influence of the American-dominated [IMF] Uncle Sam became Dr. Sam, dispensing prescriptions to the rest of the world: Cut that budget. Lower that trade barrier. Privatize that utility...
We in the Clinton Administration did not have a vision of a new post-Cold War international order, but the business and financial community did: they saw new opportunities for profits. To them, there was a role for government: helping them gain access to markets."
b) because the policy prescriptions were contractionary and the countries they were forced upon did not have the preconditions necessary to counter it. Once you've privatized state assets, cut social spending, reduced trade barriers, reduced capital controls, let unemployment soar, wiped out teachers and firefighters, and invited international capital to your party - if nobody comes because there's a better party next door, what have you got left? So what if international capital does come, has a huge party, and walks out as the party's ending leaving you with the mess, what have you got left then?
When you make a nation's economic performance dependent on the whims of international capital and the global market, you take away its self determination (policies are set according to the desires of investors and bond holders, not the electorate) and you make its economic future unstable (a nicer country can come along and sweep your investors off their feet).
As Krugman said (p113) "Now, consider the situation from the point of view of those clever economists who were making policy in Washington. They found themselves dealing with economies whose hold on investor confidence was fragile... The overriding objective of policy must therefore be to mollify market sentiment... And that is how the Keynesian compact got broken: international economic policy ended up having little to do with economics. It became an exercise in amateur psychology, in which the IMF and the Treasury Department tried to persuade countries to do things they hoped would be perceived as favorable."
Investor confidence replaced consumer confidence as a means to recovery.
The problem now, in 2010 (bye bye 90's), is that globally investors have little confidence, globally countries have depressed economies, globally governments are finding no one to pick up the slack from their contractionary actions.
And meanwhile central banks are too busy fighting inflation and governments are too busy trying to woo back the speculators to pick up their economics textbooks and fight the recession.
They're stuck in the nineties again.
#7 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Wed 26 Oct 2011 at 01:35 PM
They're stuck in the nineties, again.
(Sooo close to under 600 chars)
#8 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Wed 26 Oct 2011 at 01:38 PM
On the topic of Alesina,
http://www.economonitor.com/rebeccawilder/2011/10/26/the-euro-area-precedent-for-policy-failure/
"The growth and fiscal policy adjustments assumed under the program individually have precedent in other countries’ experience, but experience to date under the program suggests that Greece will not be able to set a new precedent by realizing at the same time and from very weak initial conditions a large internal devaluation, fiscal adjustment, and privatization program...
Greece will (of course) not be able to set a new precedent of public sector and private sector deleveraging amid weakening external demand and a fixed exchange rate. However, I’d like to focus here on the ‘precedent in other countries’ experience’. What precedent?
One might point to Canada’s mid-1990s budget initiative that dropped program spending from 16.8% of GDP in 1993-1994 to 12.1% in 1999-2000 as a candidate for precedent. Marshall Auerback and Stephen Gordon refuted this claim as applicable to current conditions. However, we now have economic data available with which to compare the Canadian austerity experience to that of the Euro area.
What’s happened in Europe over the last year: Divergence. Since the middle of 2010, fiscal austerity and a drive for internal devaluation to ‘increase competitiveness (whatever that is) slashed GDP growth on a quarterly basis for all countries under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) program...
I point you again to Marshall Auerback and Stephen Gordon for the whys. But basically, easy monetary policy, depreciation of the currency, and robust US demand fostered the fiscal shift in Canada. None of these conditions exist in the Euro area, so those program (austerity) countries – Ireland, Greece, and Portugal – suffer contraction."
#9 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Thu 27 Oct 2011 at 12:43 PM
It's not complicated. There just isn't enough money left to give "free" education, "free" health care, "free" housing, "free" food, etc. to those who choose not to work.
The Socialist Gravy Train is derailing all over Europe, not just in Greece.
In France, illegal immigrants there got chopped from subsidized health care. In Denmark, unemployment benefits were cut in half. In Germany, 10% of the military bases are being closed. In Spain, labor cuts (including a 5% cut in government employees' salaries) and massive spending cuts.
Denmark will be an interesting case - the government there is trying to "spend its way out of bankruptcy" with a stimulus program that should make Obama proud - and a tax credit plan taken straight out of the Democratic field manual. BUT.... They've also scrapped their early retirement boondoggle, chopped unemployment benefits, and cut welfare to immigrants. Kind of like a commie/Tea Party hybrid. It will be interesting to see how this shakes out.
#10 Posted by padikiller, CJR on Thu 27 Oct 2011 at 01:55 PM
A really good post on third way new democrats and their abandonment of liberal ideas and the basic economic lessons learned during the depression. They're all friedmanites now.
http://www.eschatonblog.com/2011/10/centrists.html
"There has to be an underlying organizing principle for why they would bail out banksters, and f[*]ck over homeowners, why they would subsidize big Pharma at the expense of their base voters. And I think I've finally gotten some of what's going on.
The president, and the Democrat's Senate leadership, reject movement liberalism. The ideology they follow is grounded in the impact of globalization on world capital and labor markets. They believe the US has to reduce labor costs to be competitive as capital flows freely around an interconnected world—that it is unrealistic, “neo-populist” to think the middle class can be preserved. But they also recognize that the middle class is not gonna be happy with these necessary, painful policies"
#11 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Fri 28 Oct 2011 at 10:42 PM
Rats. The cgi ate my freidmanite link.
#12 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Fri 28 Oct 2011 at 10:51 PM
You have identified a problem, but not the one you think you have. The problem is that the WSJ is presenting as fact something that it has no good reason to believe is fact.
Your belief that the effect of government spending is an "accepted and/or empirical fact (or about as close as economics gets to one)" is just ridiculous. Almost nothing in macroeconomics rises to that level. (If newspapers want to take positions based on accepted facts, they can start by pointing out the effects of rent control or minimum wage laws. I'm sure you'd support that, right?)
#13 Posted by Thomas, CJR on Sat 29 Oct 2011 at 12:28 PM
Government contraction, without special mitigating conditions, always produces economic contractions just as low interest rates, baring certain special conditions, will always create economic expansion.
In either case, it's really simple economics, supply and demand. Government work affects the demand of general work in an economy. Increases in government work decreases the supply of labor raising the value of work, decreases increases the supply of labor lowering the value of work. Without rare offsets from private industry to counter the demand changes from government, this will always hold true.
Same thing goes for interest rates. High interest rates lower the supply of money increasing the demand for money and lowering the demand for what money buys (such as labor and assets). Low interest rates increase the supply of money lowering the demand for money and increasing the demand for what money buys.
And as far as minimum wage laws go, their effect is the same as any situation involving high wages around regions with competitive labor pools and transport costs, it depends on your type of economy.
I don't see businesses in New York bleeding out of the city to India because New York bankers are overpriced. What holds them there?
#14 Posted by Thimbles, CJR on Sat 29 Oct 2011 at 01:49 PM