Dismay.
That was our response to Frontline’s recent documentary on the financial crisis. And our problem wasn’t even with the crisis. It was with Frontline. We turned our TV to PBS with high expectations—Frontline has earned that—but its latest piece was fatally flawed.
The biggest problem?
It started way too late in the game. Here is the dependably sonorous announcer setting the stage:
Tonight, from the boardrooms on Wall Street to the backrooms in Washington, Frontline goes inside the meltdown.
And then:
The story begins in the spring of 2008, after the housing bubble had burst.
Talk about starting a play with act five. Look. If you don’t go back to the mid-1990s—or at least 2004! Check the record—then you have missed most of the story here. Wall Street did not spontaneously combust. And a few quick backward glances, such as Frontline gives us, are not nearly sufficient to convey to watchers what happened.
Furthermore, if you are watching a story on the economic collapse and you don’t feel your eyes tearing up at least once, you are watching the wrong story. Have you seen all those people getting kicked out of their homes, losing their jobs? You won’t see it on Frontline.
Quite frankly, if documentarians don’t hit you in the gut with the human cost of all this, then they are not doing their job. Off topic, you say? Not in the least. Wall Street and Main Street are intimately connected. That is the essential lesson of this crisis.
But the only tears you will cry during the Frontline piece are tears of boredom. Really. About halfway through our feet started twitching.
The thing is, Frontline has drained the life from this story, and then tried to make up for it with ominous music, strangely angled shots of New York City skyscrapers and a lot of black and white photos of Hank Paulson and Ben Bernanke looking worried.
The piece is basically a chronology of collapse and nationalization: Bear, Fannie and Freddie, Lehman, AIG. The usual suspects. If you have been reading the papers with any regularity, you know the story. It is indeed what the voiceover told us at the beginning: boardrooms and backrooms. (More than a third is spent on the collapse of Bear Stearns alone.)
Furthermore, with its focus on Paulson, Bernanke and various Wall Street CEOs, it is most definitely Great Man journalism. We didn’t like in print and we don’t like it on TV. It misses the story: If you look at the crisis primarily through the lens of individuals, you will have either underplayed or missed the systemic reasons for the collapse.
And yet on Frontline we get this quote from a WSJ reporter:
It helps me to think about this crisis as a patient that’s going through spasms, and each time the spasms seem to be getting worse. And it help me to think about Bernanke and Paulson as the two doctors in the room trying to settle the patient down.
Malpractice suit anyone?
But seriously. This comment says more about the imagination of the press than it does about the crisis.
In fact, comments like this serve to obscure the actual problem, as does the Frontline piece as a whole. Focusing on concepts like “moral hazard” and “systemic risk,” as it does, is not useful as a clarification technique. It doesn’t demystify Wall Street so much as Re-mystify it. Boardrooms and backrooms indeed.
Furthermore: About five minutes.
That is how much time Frontline spends describing the mortgage crisis and credit default swaps. And guess which talking head has the job of describing those nefarious mortgage mechanisms? A VP from Lehman! After explaining how his firm offered mortgages in which your loan balance goes up, he says:
I think in hindsight it’s very easy to see there was a bubble, but when you’re at a party having a good time, sometimes it’s hard to stop and leave the party.
And that’s it. That’s the explanation.
Part of the problem here is that Frontline has taken its cue from press coverage. Most of the talking heads who tell us the story of collapse are journalists, from the New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The New Yorker and others. So problems with the Frontline piece mirror problems in the press—but, and this is Frontline’s blame alone, without reflecting the work of those who really did get it. Some of whom Frontline even interviews!
Frontline has done excellent financial reporting in the past. But despite some glowing reviews of this piece, we agree with Alternet’s Danny Schechter: Frontline ill-serves watchers here. And we hope it will take another crack at this one.

I didn't get to see the Frontline, but I was curious what you thought of This American Life's "Giant Pool of Money" piece. I thought it was helpful in simply explaining a lot of stuff that the business section assumes everyone understands. How does it compare?
#1 Posted by Katie, CJR on Mon 23 Feb 2009 at 11:26 AM
I'm glad to see I wasn't alone.
To hear Frontline tell it, the important angle was Sec. Hank Paulson's voyage of personal discovery.
Watch! his anguish as he is forced to confront the excesses of his former career.
Empathize! as he is asked to compromise his belief in the purity of the free market
Paulson's big meeting with the nine bank CEO's is portrayed as a big "get tough" moment.
As IF -
"You guys are going to take billions of dollars in goverment money - OR ELSE!!"
Yeah, Hank really put his foot down there...
Do the Frontline producers expect us to swoon over Paulson's supposed inner torment?
Fer cryin' out loud!
Not to mention allowing the execs of Bear Sterns and Lehman to talk as if they were just carried away by events beyond their control - insted of neck deep in bad assets they bought!
Way to miss the boat, Frontline. Frontline's done some world class journalism in the past, but this last one - they laid an egg.
#2 Posted by murph, CJR on Mon 23 Feb 2009 at 11:41 AM
Katie, you are right on with The Giant Pool of Money. That is one of the best explanations of the crisis yet. For some context there, take a look at Dean Starkman's "Boiler Room" piece from the September/October 2008 issue, at http://www.cjr.org/essay/boiler_room.php?page=4. He has high praise for the segment.
#3 Posted by elinore longobardi, CJR on Mon 23 Feb 2009 at 01:10 PM
What a dumb column. You're mad because Frontline didn't cover the stuff you wanted covered in a program that wasn't about that to begin with.
This wasn't a piece examining the roots of the economic mess, it was a very good step-by-step rundown on what led up to the near total meltdown of the financial system in mid-September that resulted in the infamous TARP.
Why people like you persist in criticizing a program like this because it doesn't really explain something it was never intended to explain is beyond me. Review the program for what it did discuss, not a different subject you wish it had discussed instead.
Yes, obviously, we need some good programming from Frontline and/or others that goes into the economic mess in depth, but those programs can't be thrown together in a couple of weeks. My understanding is that Frontline is working on several programs that are intended to do that, to air at the end of this season and the beginning of the next.
But in the meantime, it is possble to fairly quickly put together something that can give the public a badly needed primer on what happened to the financial system that suddenly caused Paulson to run around with his hair on fire, threw the presidential campaign into chaos and tied up the Congress for a solid month while they wailed and fought and tore their own and each other's hair.
That's what they did. It's a good thing, not a bad thing.
#4 Posted by Jane, CJR on Mon 23 Feb 2009 at 02:42 PM
I think the problem was that Frontline billed it as a documentary on the broader economic meltdown, when it was really about the financial panic. They're two very different things. The bursting of the housing bubble would have caused a recession even if it hadn't led to a financial panic. Financial panics, almost by definition, devastate parts of the financial system that have nothing to do with mortgages. They're terrifying negative feedback loops caused by systemic margin calls, forced liquidations that depress asset values, writedowns of those assets to reflect fire-sale prices, and then another round of margin calls to raise capital. Repeat as necessary.
In fairness to Frontline, accounts of the Great Depression almost always start with the stock market crash of 1929, and not the credit bubble that built up in the 1920s. And let's be honest: the story of the two financial panics (in March and September/October) is a ton more entertaining than the story of the housing bubble. And the press has reported less than 1% of the high drama that occurred in the Sept/Oct financial panic. The epic happenings at the New York Fed in Sept/Oct could fill books. (An enterprising reporter would be advised to interview NY Fed officials in the Open Markets Division. There lies a treasure trove of incredible stories.)
#5 Posted by Nick, CJR on Mon 23 Feb 2009 at 02:58 PM
Nick & Jane:
Whether or not you agree with the scope of their timeline is beside the point. What is billed as investigative journalism allows the perpetrators of the meltdown minimize their own role in it - without calling them on their evasive answers.
Bear Stearn's Alan Greenberg describes Credit Default Swaps as:
"Credit default swaps are very misunderstood. All they are is insurance policies, period. And you can't go out and just poison the well all by yourself. You can't go out and just sell a credit default swap. ... You have to have somebody on the other side that thinks, number one, that the company is going to survive and the debt is going to be paid, because you're taking out an insurance policy that if the debt isn't paid, they will pay you off in case of failure.
So it's insurance. There's nothing wrong with insurance."
If there's a more self-serving definition of CDS's out there, I haven't seen it. Frontline does point out that Bear was hip deep in CDS's - but never takes Greenberg apart for his "forces beyond our control" explanation of things.
That's weak. I don't care when you start the clock.
#6 Posted by murph, CJR on Tue 24 Feb 2009 at 03:40 PM