Yesterday, the NYT’s Andrew Ross Sorkin wrote a dog of a column arguing that AIG should get to keep its bonuses, a blinkered assertion I and many others ripped apart and one that sent him on a sputtering media tour as the business media’s Cramer of the Week.
Thankfully, the Times’s David Leonhardt has apparently talked to people outside the bubble and fires off a good rebuttal to his colleague.
I really love how Leonhardt skewers the Wall Street line here about “retention bonuses” needed to keep the “best and brightest” on the job. He gives us a brief jaunt through the last fifteen years of excuses for ginormous corporate pay and finds that the reasoning keeps changing, but the thrust somehow always stays the same:
In the booming 1990s, companies supposedly had to pay retention bonuses because executives had so many other job opportunities…
Then came the aftermath of Enron, when new scrutiny and regulations apparently made some chief executives wonder if they still wanted their jobs. “I’m thinking of actually getting out,” David D’Alessandro, the head of John Hancock Financial Services, reported hearing from one fellow chief executive.
Now we have to pay these geniuses because only they can unwind the catastrophic mess they created. What a racket!
But the latest excuse doesn’t hold much water, Leonhardt suggests:
A few years ago, when the economy was still expanding, I looked into every large company that had changed chief executives over the previous six months. Not a single boss at any of them had left for another job. Such departures are so rare that Booz & Company’s annual study of executive turnover doesn’t even include a category for them.
He points out that AIG’s explanation of its retention bonuses has shifted wholesale since the infamous contract was put in place, and, of course, that many have left anyway—and if I read the Times right yesterday, some bonuses went to people who had already left. How irreplaceable are these money-losers, anyway?
Simon Johnson, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, has pointed out that in financial crises, bankers often exaggerate the difficulty of cleaning up their mess. They do so partly to justify their own continued importance and also to fight off calls for a government takeover of banks. In reality, Mr. Johnson says, the mechanics of cleaning up hobbled banks turned out to be fairly straightforward during other recent crises, like the Asian one in the ’90s.
Now, from everything I understand credit-default swaps are much more difficult to unwind than just about anything that’s come before them. Remember Warren Buffett’s difficulty with Gen Re’s derivatives, which took years and cost hundreds of millions during the good times.
Leonhardt also puts a match to Sorkin’s straw man—that the administration wanted to shred the law:
It’s entirely understandable, then, that the Obama administration, the Federal Reserve and Congress are looking for creative, legal ways to claw back some of the bonuses. That bonus money is really taxpayer money: absent a bailout, no A.I.G. would exist to pay bonuses.
Leonhardt points out what’s conventional wisdom by now—that enormous pay and its structure incentivized the reckless behavior in the first place. And he gets into some interesting solutions to the problem, including: Using tax policy to disincentivize outsized pay.
There are ways to do that by eliminating corporate tax breaks, which must be done. That stuff’s a no-brainer. The interesting question, and one I’ve been waiting for months to see in the mainstream press, is whether we should tax windfall earnings at a much-higher rate than we currently do.
Today’s tax code makes no distinction between income above $373,000 and income above, say, $5 million. Both are taxed at 35 percent.