Lewis and Einhorn spell out clearly what ought to be done now:

THERE are other things the Treasury might do when a major financial firm assumed to be “too big to fail” comes knocking, asking for free money. Here’s one: Let it fail.

Not as chaotically as Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail. If a failing firm is deemed “too big” for that honor, then it should be explicitly nationalized, both to limit its effect on other firms and to protect the guts of the system. Its shareholders should be wiped out, and its management replaced. Its valuable parts should be sold off as functioning businesses to the highest bidders — perhaps to some bank that was not swept up in the credit bubble. The rest should be liquidated, in calm markets. Do this and, for everyone except the firms that invented the mess, the pain will likely subside.

The only thing preventing that is the vestigial free-market religion that somehow hasn’t been expunged yet—you know, the one that says we can’t tell insolvent banks that led us to ruin what to do, even though we’ve given them hundreds of billions of dollars to keep them afloat because they didn’t know how to run their businesses.

Lewis and Einhorn also recommend the regulation of credit-default swaps, a bailout for homeowners, new capital requirements for banks, and a waiting-period for SEC officials to leave for Wall Street. And my favorite of them all:

Another good solution to the too-big-to-fail problem is to break up any institution that becomes too big to fail.

Amen to that. Read the whole thing.

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