The Associated Press looks at Obama’s regulatory-reform plan and finds reason for hope on its approach to tackling Too Big to Fail.
Up to now the consensus is that the administration’s approach has been to do a whole lot of nothing. The AP says, however, that “Financial regulations proposed by the president would result in leaner and simpler institutions that don’t carry the weight of the system on their marble columns.”
But while the report does point to some positive steps the administration says it will take, I don’t think the AP backs up its overall thesis. Here’s how it says the TBTF plans are tougher than everybody’s let on:
Under the administration’s proposal, companies such as Citi, Goldman Sachs and others in a broad top tier engaged in complex transactions would face stricter scrutiny and have to hold more assets and more cash as cushions against a downturn.
They also would have to anticipate their own demise, drafting detailed descriptions of how they could be dismantled quickly without causing damaging repercussions. Think of it as planning their own funerals — and burials.
“Stricter scrutiny” is pretty nebulous, and “planning their own funeral”—I’m not sure what good that does to rein them in. The only thing here that has the potential to really push companies to break themselves up is the increased capital reserves. Sorry if I’m not buying the idea that the Obama team will make these onerous enough to really matter.
It ain’t exactly a hard cap on total assets.
This next bit is cause for even more pessimism, yet more evidence of Obama’s love of the far-from-bold solution:
Obama’s plan, in short, aims to make it far less appealing to be so big. That was the middle ground the administration sought, a step short of an outright ban on systemically risky companies.
I don’t think you can just ban systemically risky companies, but you can make them less risky, which is what forcing them to radically slim down would do. The reimposition of Glass-Steagall would help, too.
I mean, let’s not over think this. It’s pretty simple, really, when you’re talking about clamping down on Too Big to Fail. Making them smaller makes them less likely to take down the system while making it easier (and less costly for taxpayers) to resolve the.
And a critical point: Administrations come; administrations go. Their stances toward enforcing regulations change. It’s much harder to change a law that limits size and/or interconnectedness.
This story smells a bit too much like administration spin to counter criticism of the gaping blind spots in their plans. As Ritholtz says, “I’ll believe it when I see it.”

The problem with AIG was that no regulatory mechanism existed to manage a bankruptcy: it wasn't a "bank." The requirement of a "last will and testament" is the most interesting part of the proposal, IMHO, because the FDIC doesn't even have enough resources to manage the actual "banks" failing around the country.
#1 Posted by Matt Osborne, CJR on Tue 7 Jul 2009 at 01:25 AM
Less about the article, and more about the problem.
1) Cutting the size is no wonder drug. Lehmann comparatively wasn't that big, but it's failure almost brought the house down. Size in fact is a cannard. Other than providing for reasonable competition, size is almost irrelevant because we'll never be allowed to make them small enough to not matter.
2) Similarly with interconnectiveness. Another cannard. These banks deal in and out of each other so fast and in so many ways that it would be a fool's errand to even try to track it in a systemic fashion. By the time you developed any measure, everything would have changed. Besides, they all have their own risk departments, and none of them had a clue until it was too late. If the locals can't even measure their own, how is a systemic regulator supposed to create a total view?
The problem in fact isn't either of these. For years on end, everything went fine. So what changed? Something had to.
What changed is OTC derivatives. Not that these are bad per se. Simply that they allowed for too many places to hide risk. From the customers. From each other. In fact, after a while, that's all that they were for. The thing about transferring risk to those more willing, what they began as, eventually became a mere sliver of totals. And because everyone was hiding everything using these, no one knew they were about to sufficate until they couldn't breathe.
Do we ban them then? Not at all. They started legitimate, and those needs still exist. What we do is ban OTC swaps. Force them all on exchanges. If it can't be standardized for an exchange, the only damned reason (in spite of what they say) is that one counterparty or the other (or both) is trying to frig the product or frig their books. Neither should be allowed. This is where you get systemic (read: hidden, unseen, unmonitorable) risk from. This is where system failure begins.
So if it's just that easy to prevent, why don't the banks want it? They certainly don't want meltdowns, do they?
Follow the money. Look at the explosion in profits over the last decade. Where did it all come from? Unmonitorable derivatives. Ban them, and the banks have to go back to old fashion banking and actually do that efficient allocation stuff again to make their money. Much harder. Not as much money. And that's why the bankers don't want it. Say bye-bye to those $50 million dollar bonuses .... which is a good thing. Didn't we want to do that anyways? Get rid of OTC swaps, and we back door that right in. And they know it. They just aren't saying it.
And think! If there isn't as much money, poof, we've shrunk the banks. Nice, huh? Back doored that right in too. And if all that risk is in the open on structured exchanges, poof, there goes the hidden interconnectiveness problem and its systemic risk. Nice. Another back door job.
Problem solved.
P.S. Ask Chris Whalen about this. I didn't think this up. He did. :-)
#2 Posted by Benedict@Large, CJR on Thu 9 Jul 2009 at 10:14 AM
Benedict,
We're in complete agreement on OTC derivatives.
But I totally disagree with your assertion that Lehman wasn't that big. Lehman had $650 billion in assets at time of bankruptcy.
#3 Posted by Ryan Chittum, CJR on Thu 9 Jul 2009 at 11:23 AM