Given Victoria Clarke’s role in creating and carrying out that “military analysts as media Trojan horse” plan the New York Times described yesterday, I thought I’d link to this column Clarke wrote for the September/October 2002 issue of CJR on “the military-media relationship” in general, and media “access to the war on terrorism” in particular. Wrote Clarke:

When it comes to the Department of Defense’s service to the media, we can do better.

According to yesterday’s Times piece, Defense was actually doing a heckuva job “serving” the media even back in 2002 — no small thanks to Clarke (emphasis mine):

Clarke, the former public relations executive who oversaw the Pentagon’s dealings with the [military] analysts as assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, had come to her job with distinct ideas about achieving what she called “information dominance.” In a spin-saturated news culture, she argued, opinion is swayed most by voices perceived as authoritative and utterly independent.

And so even before Sept. 11, she built a system within the Pentagon to recruit “key influentials” — movers and shakers from all walks who with the proper ministrations might be counted on to generate support for Mr. Rumsfeld’s priorities.

In the months after Sept. 11, as every network rushed to retain its own all-star squad of retired military officers, Ms. Clarke and her staff sensed a new opportunity. To Ms. Clarke’s team, the military analysts were the ultimate “key influential” — authoritative, most of them decorated war heroes, all reaching mass audiences.

The analysts, they noticed, often got more airtime than network reporters, and they were not merely explaining the capabilities of Apache helicopters. They were framing how viewers ought to interpret events. What is more, while the analysts were in the news media, they were not of the news media. They were military men, many of them ideologically in sync with the administration’s neoconservative brain trust, many of them important players in a military industry anticipating large budget increases to pay for an Iraq war…

Other administrations had made sporadic, small-scale attempts to build relationships with the occasional military analyst. But these were trifling compared with what Ms. Clarke’s team had in mind. Don Meyer, an aide to Ms. Clarke, said a strategic decision was made in 2002 to make the analysts the main focus of the public relations push to construct a case for war. Journalists were secondary. “We didn’t want to rely on them to be our primary vehicle to get information out,” Mr. Meyer said.


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Liz Cox Barrett is a writer at CJR.