SANTA BARBARA, CA — Nuclear power plants are complex, interdependent systems of systems, and the state and federal bureaucracies that regulate them are labyrinthine. Because anything to do with radiation is politically charged, the regulators and owners of nuclear plants speak a dry language of numbered rules, lettered sub-rules, acronyms, and jargon. Except for the relatively rare outage or accident, news reporting on nuclear power plants tends to revolve around electric rate cases, proceedings so full of qualified quantification as to frustrate most attempts at simplification. Covering this complex of complexity—further complicated by the continuous war between supporters and opponents of nuclear power—is an exercise in explaining the arcane under duress.
Given this reality, reporters at the Los Angeles Times and U-T San Diego did yeoman’s work when Southern California Edison announced in June that it would close the remaining two reactors at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, an iconic beachside facility between Los Angeles and San Diego that had served electricity to some 1.4 million homes. Immediately and in the weeks after the announcement, the Los Angeles Times responded with major stories on the reasons for the decision, the effect the closure will have on the region’s energy supply and electricity consumers, and on the as-yet-uncertain process for decommissioning the plant, which could take decades. U-T San Diego published a similar flurry of well-reported stories that covered the basics of the reasons for the closure, as well as the impact on consumers, workers, and the electricity supply. At both papers, coverage included infographics that effectively explained the problem that forced the plant to close—vibration that caused wear in tubes for the plant’s steam generators. (The Times’s tick-tock takeout on the history of the steam generator snafu, published in July, is especially comprehensive.) The specifics of the San Onofre closing were covered well and thoroughly.
The context within which those basics reside, however, was far less well-examined, and the two major newspapers closest to the San Onofre plant both therefore missed a real opportunity to inform readers about the major energy choices California and the country will need to make in the coming decade.
The decision to shut San Onofre was at base economic; its majority owner decided that the probable costs and regulatory uncertainly were too great to risk going forward with the repair or replacement of the plant’s steam generators. Although Southern California Edison claimed that the problem at San Onofre was unique and not a reflection on the viability of the national nuclear industry, nuclear power experts have repeatedly remarked on a trend: Under competition from cheaper energy sources, some utilities are shuttering nuclear plants licensed to run for years hence. Earlier this year, Virginia-based Dominion decided to close the Kewaunee nuclear plant in Wisconsin “based purely on economics.” In February, Duke Energy announced it would close its Crystal River nuclear plant in Florida and look to replace its output with other sources.
These moves do not appear to be anomalies. As former Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Peter Bradford wrote for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists earlier this year (disclosure: I am deputy editor of the Bulletin and edited this story), “In late 2012, both the Exelon Corporation and Xcel Energy Inc. canceled plans to expand existing nuclear units, citing declining forecasts of demand for electricity and long-term forecasts of low natural gas prices. In January 2013, industry analysts speculated that several other units might also close in the near future for economic reasons.” The article has a telling headline: “How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing.” In Bradford’s view, in the absence of enormous (and unlikely) new subsidies from the federal government, economics will dictate the end of the US nuclear power industry by the 2050s. (Note: This story is behind a paywall, but journalists can obtain a complimentary subscription here.)
Bradford’s assessment is, of course, not universal. Other experts have less negative takes. It is, however, fair to say that outside the nuclear industry and its trade and lobbying groups, there is widespread acknowledgement that nuclear power faces a difficult economic landscape in the United States, and that its growth and long-term survival are anything but certain.

After forty years in energy engineering, a score of nukes, two score fossil fueled power plants and decades assessing advanced technology, what is coming? the barriers? when? how much? (I never worked on SONGS.) I can state with certainty:
The bedrock issue with nuclear power is survival, both economic and societal. Whoever gets it right, will survive. Others will not.
There were two dots, one inch apart, under the ocean near the Japanese coast. In a a few seconds they separated by over 180 feet, and killed some 20,000 people. The utility had been told, years ago, by an expert in tsunamis, that the Fukashima plants, located in the 1960s, was not conservative, had risk of flooding. "That is one man's opinion" was their response. I engineered nine such plants in the US; knew the decision makers. Locating emergency electrical gear in the basement was cheaper. And dumb anywhere flooding was a risk. The largest tsunamis on earth have been recorded, over centuries, along that coast. Thus far, one man has been killed there; he fell from a height.
It is probable that the steam generator engineer, knowledgeable in flow induce vibration, and tube design, is dead, or running a restaurant. He may have been laid off twenty years ago. The problems with Fukushima, SONGS, or Crystal River (split concrete containment) have a common root: no experienced engineers, and where the remnant exists, they are ruled by financial, political, or legal types. The US Congress is devoid of engineers, the nuclear regulatory commission was chaired by an avowed enemy of nuclear energy, an academic, picked by the Senate Leader. We have experienced the death of a American profession; the knowledgeable people now live in China, or France. China produces far more engineers than America; we produce lawyers, ball players and movie actors. US colleges quit teaching this power technology decades ago; their graduates could not find work.
The result is, and will be, a lowered standard of living because energy will be priced beyond the ability of common people to buy it. Any business which used lots of energy have left, or will leave, in order to survive. Our aged grid may collapse one very hot day (or a New England blizzard). Think a ten year outage: no toilets, drinking water, lights, or heat, for millions.
Everybody has to die. That is the bedrock risk assessment involving energy, of every type. In my judgment the KBG would have done a better job for America. In energy policy, a complex topic involving risk, we listen to fools.
#1 Posted by R. L. Hails Sr. P. E., CJR on Tue 16 Jul 2013 at 11:02 AM
WIth all due respect to Mr. Mecklin, his lens still isn't broad enough .... Since 2010, according to Ventyx, the U.S. has seen 14,600 MW of coal-fired power plant closings; another 11,700 MW of natural gas plant closings and, among the balance, 3,500 MW of nuclear plant closings. So 10 percent of the total closings of 35,500 MW of power plants closings has been nuclear. That leaves 90 percent that's something else. If you believe this is strictly a "nuclear" story, you're mistaken; it's an electricity story.
#2 Posted by Steve Kerekes, Nuclear Energy Institute, CJR on Tue 16 Jul 2013 at 02:35 PM
To take Mr. Kerekes comments a little further,
This is also a story about legal mandates regarding Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) not just a nuclear story.
Recent information and studies are showing that existing plants being taken off-line for several reasons inlcuding larger economic picture. However those studies performed by people and companies closer to the generation side are also pointing out that the artificial legal framework of state mandated RPS's are forcing utilities to use critical resources on wind and solar when those resources could be used for other more rate payer beneficial purposes.
Legal mandates for intermittent power sources are having more of an effect on utility long range decision making then many believe.
#3 Posted by Bill Rodgers, CJR on Sat 20 Jul 2013 at 09:12 AM