There is a dark irony to the faintly racist idea that Afghans are unprincipled mercenaries available to the highest bidders, especially given the rampant panic in Washington at the inescapable conclusion that Hamid Karzai stole his own reelection. And still, after failed eight years of alternatively condemning a “culture of corruption” and thinking we just need to bribe the Afghans a little more, you see ostensibly smart columnists suggesting we try to bring back the nineteenth century.
Bribing the tribes is a variation of “arm the tribes,” a meme that swept the reporter-world in 2008 but then swiftly disappeared. The Big Thinkers who crafted U.S. military doctrine in Iraq began training their eyes on Afghanistan in the latter half of 2008—and the reporters following them often uncritically repeated the same old stories without question or criticism. In short, the press fell down on the job, waiting until the DOD stopped pushing a given idea—paving the roads, arming tribes, and so on—before they finally questioned it.
Now, though, it’s the pundits’ turn. Fareed Zakaria kicked off the latest trend, writing in early September that, “Buying, renting, or bribing Pashtun tribes should become the centerpiece of America’s stabilization strategy, as it was Britain’s when it ruled Afghanistan.”
Did you know the British were successful in ruling Afghanistan through Pashtun proxies? The actual British would probably disagree. They went to war with Afghanistan three times, invading it twice. In 1842, after a few years of their propping up a corrupt and unpopular king, the Afghans rebelled and killed 16,000 troops as they tried to retreat to Jalalabad—one of the most spectacular defeats the British Army ever suffered. When the British Empire tried again to invade Afghanistan in 1878, they barely lasted a year before the British mission, and their Indian guards, were killed by Afghan troops demanding additional bribes. The third Anglo-Afghan War was, at best, a draw, with Britain winning a few battles but Afghanistan gaining full independence from British domination.
There’s also the somewhat inconvenient fact that Afghanistan in 1838 is not the same as Afghanistan in 2009.
A few days after Zakaria’s call for rampant bribery, Fred Kaplan joined the fun, proclaiming that bribery “does tend to work, at least in the short run.” Unfortunately, his reason for saying so is that that’s how General David Petraeus “pacified much of northern Iraq.” Besides tripping over a basic, somewhat obvious premise—Iraq and Afghanistan are very different countries—it is an illogical argument: the Afghan government is illegitimate and corrupt, so therefore we should bribe them for our own ends. It fails a basic “a, therefore b” test.
A week later, David Ignatius chimed in, this time combining the ideas of Zakaria and Kaplan. “The best answer the British came up with” to working with the Afghans, he says, was “paying them subsidies, wooing them away from the baddies who genuinely threatened British interests, but otherwise letting them run their own affairs.” It’s noteworthy how he papers over the word “bribe,” since it carries such tremendous baggage. But how well did the British approach work, David? “That was a cynical approach and it left Afghanistan a poor, backward country. But it worked adequately, especially compared with the alternative, which was unending bloodshed in a faraway country that refused to be colonized.”
What a remarkable statement. Despite three horrible, bloody wars that killed tens of thousands of British citizens (not just soldiers, but their families as well), Ignatius claims the British policy “worked adequately.” Also, considering the British response to each massacre actually was incredible bloodshed—they burned central Kabul to the ground in 1842, for example—I’m not really sure how he can be so certain that the Brits think their Afghan policy actually served their own interests.