Earlier this week, Justin Elliott had a great piece at TPM Muckraker exploring how the notion that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day bomber, had left Nigeria on a one-way ticket for Detroit—an idea that is not true—has gone largely unchecked in the media. As Elliot documents, reports that Abdulmutallab had purchased a one-way ticket, sourced to unnamed federal officials, first appeared on Christmas Day. Though correct reports that the ticket was actually a round-trip fare appeared in the American press no later than December 28, the one-way claim quickly became part of the narrative of the bombing attempt, and one of the key “red flags” that security officials purportedly missed in the run-up to the event. No less an authority than former attorney general Michael Mukasey referenced it in a January 6 op-ed for The Wall Street Journal; on Monday, it was repeated as fact in a McClatchy editorial.
Elliott calls this episode a “remarkable example of how bad information can travel far and wide,” which it is. But it’s also an example of how, in an integrated and free-flowing media environment, bad info can infiltrate the reporting even of news organizations that have previously gotten the story right.
Elliott flags one of these outlets: the Associated Press. The AP was one of the first places to report correctly that the ticket was round-trip, with that brief December 28 report, and got this point correct again in a longer story published on New Year’s Eve and a timeline of events published on January 7. But then, on January 8, the AP moved an article that included this statement:
Abdulmutallab apparently bought his ticket in cash, was flying the same day, had no check-in luggage and purchased a one way fare.
(A slightly different version of the story, with a different byline and dateline but the same language, appears here.)
So how does a news outlet incorporate a factual error after first getting it right? There may be a clue in the bylines and datelines. Several of the AP stories referring to a round-trip ticket came out of Nigeria, but Lagos-based reporter Jon Gambrell was not listed among the eight contributors to the January 8 piece.
That helps explain why the error wasn’t caught. But where did it come from? An AP review, initiated after CJR made an inquiry, found, according to spokesman Jack Stokes, that it was “based on reporting with the security analyst cited by name in the story—John Harrison.” Harrison may well have picked up the bad information from other, incorrect media reports. Apparently, so had the the AP staffers who didn’t flag his misperception before it crossed the wires. “The story should have referenced our own previous reporting on the subject,” said Stokes.
A variation on the same tale can be found at the Los Angeles Times. In its news reporting, the LAT never reported incorrectly that Abdulmutallab’s ticket was for one-way travel. But the paper did, on January 6, publish a letter by a reader who made that incorrect statement. The same day, veteran correspondent Andrew Malcolm published a blog post (since corrected) also repeating the one-way claim. Asked what his source for the claim was, Malcolm replied “early reporting”—meaning, probably, his general sense drawn from the early reports. (He did not recall specifically whether he’d heard the one-way claim in his own reporting.)
So what does all this mean? With respect to Abdulmutallab and airplane security, probably not that much: for those who see the Christmas Day episode as a grievous security lapse, the one-way ticket was only one small plank in the argument. (Indeed, the president, who’s well-informed on this point, thinks some changes are needed.)
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We don’t need profiling to identify Individuals like the Christmas-Day Bomber!
Virtually all media outlets are discussing whether we should be profiling all Arab Muslims; I will in the one-page explain why we don’t need profiling. Over 15 years ago, we at the Center for Aggression Management developed an easily-applied, measurable and culturally-neutral body language and behavior indicators exhibited by people who intend to perpetrate a terrorist act. This unique methodology utilizes proven research from the fields of psychology, medicine and law enforcement which, when joined together, identify clear, easily-used physiologically-based characteristics of individuals who are about to engage in terrorist activities in time to prevent their Moment of Commitment.
The Problem
Since the foiled terrorist attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian national on Northwest Flight 253 to Detroit, the President has repeatedly stated that there has been a systemic failure as he reiterates his commitment to fill this gap in our security. This incident, like the Fort Hood shooting, exemplifies why our government must apply every valid preventative approach to identify a potential terrorist.
The myriad methods to identify a terrorist, whether “no-fly list,” “explosive and weapons detection,” mental illness based approaches, “profiling” or “deception detection” - all continue to fail us. Furthermore, the development of deception detection training at Boston Logan Airport demonstrated that the Israeli methods of interrogation will not work in the United States.
All media outlets are discussing the need for profiling of Muslim Arabs, but profiling does not work for the following three reasons:
1. In practice, ethnic profiling tells us that within a certain group of people there is a higher probability for a terrorist; it does not tell us who the next terrorist is!
2. Ethnic profiling is contrary to the value our society places on diversity and freedom from discrimination based on racial, ethnic, religious, age and/or gender based criteria. If we use profiling it will diminish our position among the majority of affected citizens who support us as a beacon of freedom and liberty.
3. By narrowing our field of vision, profiling can lead to the consequence of letting terrorists go undetected, because the terrorist may not be part of any known “profile worthy” group – e.g., the Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh
The Solution
Our unique methodology for screening passengers can easily discern (independently of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, age, and gender) the defining characteristics of human beings who are about to engage in terrorist acts.
The question is when will our government use true “hostile intent” through the “continuum of aggressive behavior” to identify potential terrorists? Only when observers focus specifically on “aggressive behavior” do the objective and culturally neutral signs of “aggression” clearly stand out, providing the opportunity to prevent these violent encounters. This method will not only make all citizens safer, but will also pass the inevitable test of legal defensibility given probable action by the ACLU.
As our Government analyzes what went wrong regarding Abdulmatallab’s entrance into the United States, you can be assured that Al Qaeda is also analyzing how their plans went wrong. Who do you think will figure it out first . . . ?
Visit our blog at http://blog.AggressionManagement.com where we discuss the shooting at Fort Hood and the attempted terrorist act on Flight 253.
#1 Posted by John Byrnes, CJR on Sat 16 Jan 2010 at 07:30 AM
It figures that MSNBC started the misinformation, and it figures that the "professional journalists" of the dwindling newspapers regurgitated it in unison.
Example #3,953,538 of the laziness and inepitude that pervades the newsrooms of the Dead Tree media.
#2 Posted by padikiller, CJR on Mon 18 Jan 2010 at 10:37 PM