To his many fans, Ricks has deftly chronicled the monumental, long-overdue rise of counterinsurgency, a form of warfare that Americans are attempting to master in an age in which global terrorism and small-scale conflicts, rather than a cold-war enemy like the former Soviet Union, define the threats to the United States. To critics, however, he has all but become a spokesman for that doctrine—to the point that he and other journalists in his circle have lost their outsider perspective and have become difficult to distinguish
from the administration officials who are currently pushing a military approach that, in the eyes of these critics, is a huge global gamble.
“The events for which the Iraq war will be remembered probably have not yet happened,” Ricks writes in The Gamble, and it is indeed too early to say whether the media’s assessments of the surge and the military’s new counterinsurgency strategy have been prescient or misguided. But it is clear that journalists have been much more optimistic in their assessments of the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in
recent months and years, and it is worth trying to figure out how this shift occurred. To what extent did the wars change, and to what extent did Tom Ricks and other journalists themselves change?
Ricks hardly seemed destined for a career as a military reporter. He wrote poetry in high school and studied it at Yale, where he was an English major and from which he graduated in 1977. He grew up outside of New York City and in Kabul, where his father taught at university. After college, he moved to Washington and began to write for The Wilson Quarterly, The New Republic, and other magazines. He was hired by The Wall Street Journal in 1982 and served as its Pentagon correspondent, traveling to Somalia a decade later to write about U.S. troops in Mogadishu, his first assignment to cover the military overseas. In 1997, he wrote Making the Corps, a book with a somewhat romantic view of military service (“as gung-ho yet sensitive a treatment of the Marines as any Devildog could hope for,” wrote a Christian Science Monitor reviewer; CJR was kind to the book in a March/April 2007 Second Read feature). Ricks traced the lives of several dozen new recruits and followed them through an eleven-week boot camp on Parris Island, South Carolina, and into their first year of service. The book helped convince Nathaniel Fick, who has served in Iraq and who was named CEO of the Center for a New American Security in June, to enlist.
While Ricks was at the Journal, he was part of a team that won a Pulitzer Prize in 2000 for a ten-part series about military spending. He moved to The Washington Post that same year, and in 2001 he and a group of reporters wrote a series about the U.S. response to the attacks of September 11 that won the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for national reporting.
In 2003, Ricks went to Iraq, where he embedded with various military units and saw firsthand how the troops were operating in that country, and he continued to report there over the next several years. In many ways, he was appalled. The soldiers seemed to be going about it all wrong, he thought, and there seemed to be little hope of defeating the insurgency.

Concerns about the fact that counterinsurgencies last for decades, incur tremendous costs, and yet rarely work have been set aside. Granted, there never was much debate over counterinsurgency in the media, but at this point the discussion, however sporadic it was, seems to have ended.
So the major, persistent drawbacks, and the horrendous costs, and the unlikelihood of success are just forgotten?
Thanks mainly to guys like the masculine, tough, smart sell-out, Tom Ricks.
Cuz it's so much BETTER if you have the Generals on your side, and they LIKE you.
#1 Posted by Woody, CJR on Wed 9 Sep 2009 at 09:44 AM
By the way: With Mad Albright and Richard Armitage, Dennis Blair, and other glaring examples of the "pro-military" ideology on its board or on the masthead, it stretches credulity to call CNAS "independent."
#2 Posted by Woody, CJR on Wed 9 Sep 2009 at 09:52 AM
I have noticed with T Ricks when he was on TV after his second book that his ideas of Iraq were all military, not civilian. We as a people have very strange views about other people's cultural traditions and language. Only a small percentage see any value in learning another language and the history and culture of the land. This attitude gets us--the US--into trouble time and again. We seem to think anything others do that is not the same as ours has to be wrong. Ricks has totally forgotten that we were to free the Iraqi people not shoot and bomb them to smithereens. There were very few writers of any papers, magazines or TV channels that had people there that spoke the language. Today there are a few more than in 2004 but more for magazines than daily coverage. Our ambassadors seldom know the language or the culture of the nation they represent for us. EU send fluent speakers. In Germany one won't obtain the job with out a verbal and literal knowledge and use of the language and culture. This I know since I had friends from there that worked 5 years first to go to Peru but didn't pass the tests and then for Saudi Arabia. Prior to this he only knew 5 different languages and three classical ones. Our students have difficulty learning one language over 2 years and most can't speak it when they graduate. Then as tourists we get criticized for not knowing the language or expect everyone in 5 different countries to speak fluent English--just for us. Then they wonder why the book The Ugly American still stands as an allegory??!!?? Mr. Ricks needs to know more about the people and history of Iraq instead of the military's way to destroy them.
#3 Posted by Patricia Wilson, CJR on Thu 10 Sep 2009 at 08:10 PM
I asked David Kilcullen about Odierno, when he was (incredibly) answering questions from all comers on his blog in the Small Wars Journal, while simultaneously helping put together the beginning of the surge. I noted that US forces had fired a 15-min barrage on Dora the day before, and said that artillery in the city was hardly in keeping with the COIN philosophy of seeking normalcy and civil engagement. I suggested that this heavy-handedness was typical of Odierno, who was then commanding Baghdad forces. Kilcullen tended to agree about the artillery, but he added that Odierno had changed and learned a lot in Iraq. He made no effort to deny that Odierno had been thuggish in the past. One thing did happen to Odierno on the way from 2003 to 2007 that might well change a man's outlook - his son, a Captain, had his arm blown off by an IED. I'm not fully convinced that he's a new man, but his current role - keeping US casualties down and avoiding cities - gives him little opportunity to make trouble.
I've also spoken to Col Barry Johnson on several occasions, funnily enough, as a reporter for a British publication looking into detainee abuse issues, specifically the falsification of death certificates by Coalition military doctors. I found him to be a typically close-mouthed military press officer, and a bit of a hardcase. But he clearly liked Fiasco, so I guess I misread him. In fact I definitely misread him, because I later learned that he had complained to superiors about the USMC massacre at Haditha and its cover-up. From my limited perspective, I think Ricks was right to see Petraeus as a vast improvement on his predecessors, who included some of the worst generals in military history, such as Franks, Sanchez, and Casey. Petraeus is not perfect - he failed to improve the condition of Iraqi forces when that was his job in 2004-5 - but he was open to new ideas and surrounded himself with top-quality people like Kilcullen. The problem is - and this is what Ricks tends to forget - that Petraeus could only apply good tactics to terrible strategy, namely an illegal, unprovoked, disgraceful, pointless and unwinnable war based on no logical foundation but rather on a tissue of lies and a mountain of hubris.
#4 Posted by Bud0, CJR on Thu 10 Sep 2009 at 10:03 PM
Another COIN factor that is not mentioned in most coverage is how to cope with in-theater time passage.
Especially now in Afghanistan, we have now "embraced" COIN strategy, except for counterproductive air strikes, manned & drone. A bigger problem is that we've been in Afghanistan for 8 years & have not built up infrastructure or public security outside Kabul.
The time problem - now the military comes back & says "We need X more years."
Since they've switched strategies, they act as if it's now Year 1 in-theater for Coalition troops. But, it's not - it's Year 8 and surprise - Afghans hate foreigners in their country uninvited just as the Iraqis & the USA do.
I keep not hearing estimates of when the Afghan gov't. or people will force us out.
#5 Posted by Brett Greisen, CJR on Fri 11 Sep 2009 at 06:08 AM
I'll make only three points:
1. Any statement by me as (accurately) quoted by Tara McKelvey comes with the standard disclaimer that I am speaking only for myself and neither Military Reporters & Editors nor the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review;
2. I have immense and enduring respect for Tom Ricks the reporter, a man who inspired my decision to pursue investigations of security issues in the first place and to whom I once sojourned to get advice on military reporting;
3. I stand by my commonsensical view that CNAS, a think tank invented in part to fill the administration of any Democrat elected president with appointees, is a partisan think tank. If you don't want to believe me, however, I would note the recent exchange between Sen. Jim Webb, D-Va., and CNAS founder Kurt Campbell, part of the confirmation hearing for a State Department gig --
SEN. WEBB: Yes. Thank you.
There has been a question with respect to the Center for a New American Security and its relationship with StratAsia, and I'd like to again give you a chance to clarify that. The question really revolves around the creation of the Center for a New American Security in '07 being heavily funded by defense contractors in government contracts.
And then from staff notes 11, former CNAS employees then migrating into the president's administration, and whether there are appropriate firewalls between the formation of that.
This isn't the same situation as, I know you would appreciate, as a Heritage or an AEI or a Brookings that had been in existence, for a long period of time, and had resident scholars. The viewpoint here is that it was created just before an election cycle, with these contracts moving into it, and then so many of the principals or employees moving into the administration.
Now, back to me. I think CJR missed a real chance here to ask hard questions about why reporters are wooed to join these think tanks. How much are they paid? How often do the publications that serve as their day jobs monitor the policy work they provide? How often do these same publications dislose to readers that the person doing the reporting might be quoting sources with whom he (or she) shares a professional relationship?
As the traditional media continue to fracture and new outlets emerge, such as the Abu Muqawama blog run through CNAS, should we not be looking harder at the role now played by journos imported to these blogs?
Are they not trading on their cachet and legitimacy earned at the traditional news organizations to become defacto sales persons for policy shops? Should watchdog publications such as CJR and SPJ's Quill, along with the wider community of journalists, begin to debate these issues more openly?
#6 Posted by Carl Prine, CJR on Sat 12 Sep 2009 at 09:56 AM
I agree with Carl on PNAS. AEI is also an "independent, nonpartisan" think tank, and so is Brookings; each organization has a house style and house political tendency, some more than others.
#7 Posted by Chap, CJR on Sat 12 Sep 2009 at 09:14 PM
It's hard for me to see how someone who is skeptical of the objectivity of the media's objectivity would see this article as anything other than proof of anti military bias. Fiasco was anti military, anti admiinistration and is therefore good. The sequel speaks well of the military and takes a respectful tone to the administration so Tom Ricks becomes a "sellout."
#8 Posted by Mike Hennessy, CJR on Sun 13 Sep 2009 at 10:37 PM
US Grant and Westmoreland suck! Get Robert E Lee and Douglas MacArthur up there chief!
#9 Posted by PEry, CJR on Sun 13 Sep 2009 at 11:10 PM
A flaw in declaring Rick's the lackey boy of the military is that it assumes that to be "impartial" is synonymous with being critical. And, Ricks is far from uncritical to anyone who reads his blog posts portending a disaster (still) in Iraq.
I would go further. Even in Fiasco, one can see his embrace of the concepts of population-centric COIN. Joining CNAS, and supporting wise generals who see the efficacy of pop-centric COIN is almost predictable.
Michael C
#10 Posted by Michael C, CJR on Mon 14 Sep 2009 at 01:59 PM
information is very important given in your magazine
#11 Posted by shahzad, CJR on Tue 15 Sep 2009 at 12:31 AM
I write as a civilian citizen with no axes to grind in the COIN debate, and as someone who "read" Ricks's first book in the form of listening to it on compact disc on a long trip along the West Coast. The book was outstanding. At one point, I was so angry that I almost drove myself off of Interstate 5. That would have been a hell of a war casualty, huh?
I am very disturbed by Rick's treatment of Colonel Gian Gentile. If Ricks disagreed with Gentile, it's his right and duty to do so. But to let his disagreement alter his portrayal of a situation's real nature is a corruption of honest journalism. Sen. Moynihan once said that we are all entitled to our opinions, but that we are not entitled to our own facts. Moynihan was right.
Ricks used his position not to report on Gentile's actions, but to attempt to punish him for his viewpoints by altering the portrayal of those actions. We see all too much of this ax-grinding and retribution in our political discourse. To have it penetrate the circles of high-level journalism is yet one more sign of the ongoing deterioration of ethical and professional standards in such a vital area of endeavor.
That "small" incident makes me doubt the veracity of anything else Thomas Ricks might "report." If he writes a devastating account of someone's behavior or performance, will it be real, or will it be an outgrowth of a side battle that we weren't informed of?
Thanks very much to CJR for that critical piece of information about Thomas Ricks and his character and professional ethics.
#12 Posted by CWP, CJR on Fri 8 Jan 2010 at 08:56 PM
I need to follow up. While I am disturbed by what Ricks did to Gentile, I do not necessarily think it invalidates Ricks's work in general. I think it reminds people, myself included, to read (and in my case with the audio book, listen) carefully along the way. We need to be on guard against manipulation.
#13 Posted by CWP, CJR on Fri 8 Jan 2010 at 09:04 PM