Something had to give. After heated talks, Merrill agreed that July to cancel its CDS contracts for a pay-out of 14 cents on the dollar – a severe “haircut”, in market parlance. The other banks also reduced their original claims. At the conclusion of talks that dragged on until May 2009, not a single lender was paid in full.

That is potentially awkward for Mr Geithner, who before joining the administration of President Barack Obama was president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the most important regional component of the US central banking system. What Congress, and perhaps historians, will have to decide is: did the government, through collusion or mistakes, take billions of dollars from the taxpayers’ purse and put them into the coffers of some of the world’s largest banks without forcing them to accept much lower payments? Why, in other words, did the counterparties of AIG wind up with so better a deal than those of SCA did – some of which were the same banks?

The FT story is great and includes a clear description (no easy feat) of the Fed’s bailout of AIG and the money that swapped hands that fall. This toward the end is terrific:

What the AIG drama exposes is that much of the recent innovation on Wall Street was dedicated to creating assets that barely traded and whose values were determined almost exclusively by computer models used by the banks and rating agencies.

In this 21st-century hall of mirrors, it has been possible for tens of billions of dollars of value to vanish or reappear at the click of a computer button – or at the behest of the rating agencies or through a change in accounting rules. That in turn makes it hard for the US government to explain whether the taxpayer really got “value for money” by bailing out AIG – or whether Americans will ever get back all the billions already spent.

And the Journal story referenced above digs out an interesting email:

“I have to think this train is probably going to leave the station soon and we need to focus our efforts on explaining the story as best we can. There were too many people involved in the deals … to keep a determined Congress from the information,” a New York Fed in-house lawyer James Bergin wrote to a colleague on March 6, 2009.

There’s more to come, obviously.

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Ryan Chittum is a former Wall Street Journal reporter, and deputy editor of The Audit, CJR's business section. If you see notable business journalism, give him a heads-up at Follow him on Twitter at @ryanchittum.