Last month, we criticized The New York Times for leaving a big hole in a page-one story on the aftermath of Bhopal—the worst industrial disaster in history—by skimming over the issue of whether Dow Chemical ought to be responsible for the cleanup. The unremediated site of the disaster, which killed 3,000 people in their sleep, has dangerously polluted the drinking water of thousands of Indians around it.
After receiving a letter from a U.K.-based Bhopal advocate spelling out why Dow is legally liable for the mess because of its acquisition of Union Carbide—which owned the chemical plant that killed all the people—we asked Dow for a response. Both letters are below.
For background, this BusinessWeek story from 2002, a year after the acquisition, says Dow was on the hook for Union Carbide’s asbestos liabilities in the U.S., but doesn’t address the issue of responsibility for the Indian disaster.
Another BW story a couple of months ago looked at the question of Dow’s liability, but doesn’t give us much more than he said/she said.
In an awkwardly worded sentence (actually four run-on sentences in the passive voice), Dow asserts that it settled liability in 1989:
Liability was settled by Union Carbide Corporation in 1989 and they have no outstanding liability for Bhopal Union Carbide Corporation and the former Union Carbide India Limited (now Eveready Industries India Limited) settled their liabilities regarding the Bhopal tragedy with the Indian government in 1989 and this settlement was upheld by the Indian Supreme Court in 1991.
The U.K. advocate, Tim Edwards, meanwhile, says the 1989 settlement dealt only with the deaths and injuries that resulted from the accident, not with remediation. This 1989 NYT story supports the advocate’s position.
Also, Dow’s claim that Union Carbide “remains a separate company” after Dow’s 2001 acquisition of UCC—even if upheld by the courts—doesn’t mean that Bhopal doesn’t affect it. While corporations protect shareholders and directors from liability (with certain exceptions), that doesn’t mean Union Carbide itself isn’t liable for its actions and those of its own subsidiaries at Bhopal. Its former CEO, Warren M. Anderson, is still a fugitive from Indian law nearly twenty-five years after the incident.
Finally, Dow claims that the Indian state in 1998 had already taken back the lease that tagged a Carbide Indian unit (and Carbide’s future owners) with responsibility to clean up the land.
But Edwards, who edits Bhopal.net, offers an interesting account of how the state decided to take back a lease so loaded with liabilities—it was a bureaucratic mistake. As it happens, as late as 1998, the Carbide unit was still (slowly) cleaning up the site, tacitly acknowledging its liability:
That is, until they got lucky: in 1998, another branch of local government, seemingly unaware of what the left hand was doing, wrote to EIIL [the unit] to ask if they were still using the land for industrial purposes and, if not, to return the lease. EIIL responded with barely suppressed glee that they were not using the land and asking for a date to return the cursed lease. The lease was duly returned in July 1998. The Pollution Control Board realized the mistake and demanded that EIIL come back and finish the work but the Union Carbide-trained manager refused, citing the hand-over of the lease.
The fact is, though, the matter of Dow’s liability remains one of genuine controversy, and our criticism of the Times was a little too easy. Still, in handling a twenty-four-year-old controversy, the Times should at least have spelled out the issues, even if it couldn’t resolve them.

Sheesh.
Whatever the legal responsibilities, the moral blame attached to the Indian government for forbidding Carbide to import safety equipment.
I don't know why this is supposed to be news in 2008, but if you hotshots are going to re-report old news, at least look at the old news.
Posted by Harry Eagar on Tue 26 Aug 2008 at 01:27 PM
Re. Harry Eagar - not sure where you get your info from Harry, but the Indian goverment never prevented Union Carbide from importing anything for its Bhopal plant. I have copies of Exim Bank documents from the 1970's that prove Carbide both specified and exported the grossly under-designed safety systems that were found so wanting in Bhopal on December 2nd-3rd 1984. The only contribution from Indian government agencies was to sign technology transfer agreements with Carbide that specified the US company's responsibility for all safety and maintenance issues at its Bhopal plant. It could be no other way, as no company, organisation or individuals in India had any prior experience of working with Carbide's ultra-hazardous MIC technology.
In fact, a Union Carbide management committee meeting on - eerily - Dec 2nd, 1973, involving the the senior most executives of the company, ratified a deliberate underinvestment in these critical safety systems. The reason? A larger investment would have resulted in Carbide losing its majority share of stock in its Indian subsidiary (due to Indian investment regulations of the time that caused Coca Cola and IBM to pull out of India altogether) and with it would have gone overarching managerial control. In other words, Carbide saved money on Bhopal's safety systems in order to retain absolute control: when these inadequate safety systems allowed Tank 610 to turn Bhopal into a gas chamber, Carbide said they'd had no control.
As for how newsworthy this story is, why don't you put that criticism to the New York Times, Time Magazine and Business Week, who have each given coverage of this epic, unresolved crime in recent weeks.
Posted by Tim Edwards on Tue 26 Aug 2008 at 04:09 PM
Well, gee, I guess I'd say that if the government told me I couldn't put a smoke alarm in my house unless I gave them the house, I'd call that prohibitive.
Posted by Harry Eagar on Tue 26 Aug 2008 at 04:29 PM
Dow continues to trot out the same rationalizations for allowing Bhopal's children to be poisoned daily, slowly killed by cancer and crippling birth defects. Explain to them that responsibilities to shareholders are more important than their very lives. Poor poor ever profitable Dow. There is no legal justification for this behavior. More on Dow's current product and legacy issues at www.truthaboutdow.org
Posted by Aquene on Tue 26 Aug 2008 at 04:49 PM
I'm genuinely interested in hearing an elaboration of this opaque metaphor, Harry. In turn, I'll gladly point you to the damning, primary source documents I'm referring to.
Posted by Tim Edwards on Tue 26 Aug 2008 at 04:49 PM
Opaque? What part of confiscation don't you get?
The government of India set the rules. Carbide decided, unwisely, to play by them. If the GoI had thought safety equipment was important, there were lots of ways to make sure it was there. Just getting out of the way would have done it.
More people die on the Indian National Railways each year for lack of elementary industrial safety equipment than died or ever will die as a result of the sabotage of the Carbide plant. Why aren't the Times etc. writing about that?
Posted by Harry Eagar on Tue 26 Aug 2008 at 08:01 PM
Harry, if Carbiders (and you seem to be one) claim that the dastardly Indian government went to the trouble of confiscating safety equipment from the Bhopal plant, then why on earth wasn't this used as a defence by Carbide during civil proceedings? Did the Indian government stop Carbide installing a crucial Vent Gas Scrubber (VGS), for example? Or confiscate it?
Apparently not. Rather, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) installed one of a size not up to the job. This chief safety system in Bhopal was designed to take a feed rate of 190 pounds per hour, with a maximum pressure of 15 psig. When the disaster ensued, MIC poured through the VGS at 40,000 pounds per hour, with an average pressure of 180 psig. By contrast, the emergency VGS at the Institute, West Virginia sister plant, with a capacity of 60,000 pounds per hour, could have neutralized the escaping gases. How did the Indian government force Carbide to cut this particular corner?
The answer is of course that they didn't. The legislative environment in India (1974 Foreign Equity Regulation Act - FERA) certainly caused Carbide to reconsider its investment in Bhopal, because each injection of capital was subject to regulations. Under FERA, UCC had to reduce its share in Union Carbide India (UCIL) to no more than 40%. High technology inputs at Bhopal were enough to gain UCC some exemptions, but they were insufficient to prevent its stake dropping below 50%. To keep its majority share, therefore, UCC would have to "reduce the amount of investment... to $20.6 million", with the cuts "mainly on the Sevin project". To achieve the cuts, as I said earlier a UCC management committee ratified a plan to send inferior, unproven technology to Bhopal.
The result was underdesigned safety systems, not up to the job of preventing a disaster that was foreseen through at least two different safety audits, one in Bhopal and one in West Virginia. As I said before, I have the documents that prove Carbide specified them and exported them.
In the 1980's, installing safety devices could cost between 15-30 % of outlay at a plant's inception. In respect of UCC's $20 million investment, this amounts to between $3 & $6 million. Thanks to the documents linked above, we know that UCC saved $8 million simply in order to retain managerial control of UCIL.
Why would Carbide take such risks with an ultra-hazardous plant? Because it was Carbide's corporate policy to keep managerial control of all its subsidiaries, and this was only possible through retention of 51% or more equity. Through management control, UCC was able to extract dividends, royalties and service fees from its subsidiaries. UCC's control extended over UCIL's board, budgets, marketing plans and the proprietary MIC technology in Bhopal. Technical control – realized through keeping the technology proprietary – extended over plant design, build, safety, training and operational practices.
Finally – and leaving aside the lack of evidence for your allegation - you contradict yourself. Your argument implicitly accepts that the quality of safety systems in Bhopal was a determining factor in the disaster. You then toss in the thoroughly discredited 'sabotage theory', which itself makes the question of safety systems redundant. On top of that, you suggest that the volume of deaths in Bhopal was anyway not out of the ordinary in India by making an (unsupported) comparison with Indian railways mortality rates. Given that you're trying to establish that the Indian government /and/or a single worker caused the disaster I wonder why you then have any interest in trying to downplay its magnitude. It reeks of desperation. Not only that, it's specious – would you downplay the deaths from September 11 by referring to annual US road death statistics?
Posted by Tim Edwards on Wed 27 Aug 2008 at 03:10 AM
The two links I tagged above didn't carry, so here they are again:
Carbide's reduced investment
Installation of unproven technology in Bhopal
Posted by Tim Edwards on Wed 27 Aug 2008 at 03:16 AM
I am not downplaying the impact, merely pointing out that the GoI has a record of not caring whether safety equipment is installed or not.
If the GoI had wanted safety equipment installed, I can think of at least 10 ways to have done it without requiring Carbide to let itself be robbed. From your own posts, it is obvious that the deal for the GoI was to extort ownership of the plant, at the expense, if necessary, of any number of its own citizens.
Carbide was willing to install better equipment, as proven by the fact that it did in the US, where it was not subject to losing its property for doing so.
Carbide managers were fools, they should have taken the colonialist route like the other companies and refused to play the game. Instead, the company chose to cooperate on equal terms with indigenous governments. That was considered progressive policy in those days.
But it appears I was naive. You really don't understand property, do you?
Posted by Harry Eagar on Thu 28 Aug 2008 at 12:54 AM
Thanks for doing the digging. I also noticed how the Times reporter treated Bhopal like some ancient dispute, along the lines of the Dome of the Rock. It's more like Agent Orange, of course, though without a U.S. veterans' constituency to push the issue and force deeper reporting.
Posted by Chris Lombardi on Fri 29 Aug 2008 at 05:37 PM
Thank you, Tim Edwards. (Some of the links still don't work though.*) The Indian railways might not be entirely safe (they do, however, provide cheap and affordable transportation for millions of Indians across the country every single day): that is no argument -- or analogy -- to condone Carbide's proven criminal negligence.
*Note from CJR webmaster: The links in both the above comments which were broken have been fixed.
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