Here’s a great piece of watchdog journalism from Bloomberg, reporting that the Metropolitan Transit Authority sold a bond issue far too cheaply, enabling Wall Streeters to pick up immediate gains—ones that were essentially financed by federal taxpayers.
Bloomberg reports the lowball pricing resulted in an immediate $3 million profit for traders on the $750 million bond sale. The profit was so immediate, in fact, that the traders never had to actually pay for the bonds before they sold them higher. Even worse, the bonds, issued just last month have continued to increase in price. Had the MTA priced them higher and gotten just half of that gain, it would have saved $48 million at once and $103 million over thirty years.
Heckuva job, guys.
They had help, of course, from Wall Street. Goldman Sachs was there, as was JPMorgan Chase. Goldie got half a million bucks for its swell advice on how to price the issue.
Bloomberg reports JP Morgan sold $2.5 billion of its own debt a few weeks later at a rate 75 basis points (0.75 percent) cheaper than it sold MTA bonds. And JP Morgan doesn’t have the power to tax people (well, not in the traditional sense of “tax”) to pay its debt service.
That seems like an apples-to-oranges comparison to me, though. JPMorgan’s issue was five-year bonds, while the MTA’s are thirty-year ones. Longer-term bonds have to pay more interest because their longer payoff period brings more risk to investors (see this chart of the various Treasury bonds, for example).
Still it is worth comparing them in this sense:
The spread between the bond yield and the benchmark Treasury issue was 3.5 percentage points at the agency’s initial sale. When trading started, that gap narrowed to about 3.2 percentage points, then contracted to 3.1 points by April 27 and 2.29 points on May 13.
One day after Dellaverson’s statement, the underwriter of the MTA offering, JPMorgan Chase & Co., sold $2.5 billion of its own debt at 2.75 percentage points above Treasuries. Those bonds didn’t surge in price when trading began, and the spread was little changed.
Dellaverson is Gary Dellaverson, the MTA’s chief financial officer. Bloomberg calls him out here:
Dellaverson’s statement said Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the agency’s financial adviser, had access to market information that helped it sell with more favorable terms than the earlier transactions that week by California and the New Jersey Turnpike Authority.
Before the MTA transaction, the price of California Build America Bonds underwritten by Goldman Sachs traded at 3.33 percentage points over Treasuries, or less than the 3.5-point spread set at the transit authority’s sale, according to Bloomberg data.
Anybody who’s been watching the news knows that California is in deep doo-doo financially—much worse off than New York. And its issue was nearly seven times as large as the MTA’s and just a day earlier. So it doesn’t make much sense that it would get cheaper rates than New York.
And the issue was massively oversubscribed. Markets work like this: If you’ve got too many buyers, your prices are too low. Simple, right? Read this:
When the agency set a 7.336 percent yield for its new debt due 2039, there were more investor orders than available securities. About $4 billion of orders were submitted for the $750 million in Build America Bonds and another $500 million in tax-exempt securities, Patrick McCoy, MTA finance director, told the agency’s finance committee April 27.
A month later, those 7.336 percent bonds yield 6.36 percent, which Bloomberg wryly spells out:
The quick rise in the New York bonds’ price showed that some investors who couldn’t buy at the initial sale were willing to accept a lower yield than was set in negotiations between the authority and bankers.
There’s no hint of overt wrongdoing here, but these kinds of massive mispricings certainly make corruption far easier. Expect Andrew Cuomo to be on the case soon.