That vision, as we’ve said more than once, is in a hurry to jettison American newspaper business’s most valuable traditions in favor of vague pronouncements about reader engagement and the use of social media, which are already widely adopted across the newspaper business.
The rest of the news business (with some glaring exceptions) is already moving on from free-content and quantity-driven models and is heading in a different direction: keeping print alive, while charging for online access to try to maintain quality—and vice versa. Call it the muddle-through approach. It’s not sexy but it fits a new news reality that has changed dramatically since even 2009.
It’s quite possible—likely even—that other major newspaper companies will have to restructure under bankruptcy protection to make it to the other side. But if they do, those with digital-subscription revenue streams will have a better shot of making it in the long run.
JRC is about to take a second bite at the apple, the bankruptcy court willing. Here’s hoping it can crack the code on a digital business model (perhaps with the help of subscriptions) that supports the kind of newsgathering its communities need.
In the meantime, a little humility wouldn’t hurt.
A corporate BK in service of a related party transaction? In a world of laws, that might be almost sleazy enough to rouse a Trustee. Watch and see what happens.
#1 Posted by Edward Ericson Jr., CJR on Thu 6 Sep 2012 at 05:46 PM
I agree that financial opacity is very annoying - it facilitates Wall Street-flavored spinning - hyping the good, hiding the bad.
*But* - I wonder what your take is on the much-hyped "triumph" of the NYT paywall - another situation where *detailed* numbers are greatly lacking.
For example, some long unanswered NYT paywall questions:
1) What % of the amazingly stable unique visitor/pageview numbers come from the decidedly *non-paywall* parts of the NYT eco-system (the blogs, etc.)?
2) What is the "churn" among digital subs (ie, how many subs drop each month, quarter, etc.)?
3) What % of subs are there because of i) special promotions (a la Lincoln kick-off) or ii) bulk purchases (Democratic party, etc.)?
4) How many reported digital subscribers are digital-only (not dragooned in by virtue of their print subscription)?
Final point - the shortfall in the pensions may have a *lot* to do with the Fed-controlled collapse in interest rates (which are used to discount future pension liabilities).
When interest rates fall, required annual pension contributions rise.
Thus, the surge in annual pension liabilities.
#2 Posted by cas127, CJR on Thu 6 Sep 2012 at 06:16 PM
cas127,
I'd be all for the NYT giving us every number they have, but they already disclose a good deal--far more than JRC does.
1--don't know
2--digital churn is less than print churn.
3--Lincoln promo is long over but I don't know about bulk.
4--all of them are paid. Newspaper subscribers get free digital access.
ultimately, it all boils down to what revenues are doing, and those are disclosed.
#3 Posted by Ryan Chittum, CJR on Thu 6 Sep 2012 at 07:06 PM
Regarding that 235% increase in digital revenue, you are correct that it is 235% of not much, and just represents JRC catching up with where most of the industry already was. According to the bankruptcy filing, digital revenue is running at 15.3% of total advertising revenue. That's just about exactly where the industry as a whole is, per NAA.org stats. A good accomplishment over three years (they must have started at about 4.6%. In terms of dollar sales, the bankruptcy affadavit projects $20 million in revenue over the next 30 days, and says that 67% of revenue is advertising. So, assuming it's an average month (September tends to be), this means digital revenue is about $2 million a month, up from about $600,000 a month in 2009. And a question would be, how much of that is actually "upsold" from print as "added value" in online/print combination sales?
#4 Posted by Martin Langeveld, CJR on Fri 7 Sep 2012 at 12:27 PM