Coleman: “We actually, we have responsibility for the Fed Reserve programs and operations, to conduct audits in that area. In terms of investigating, would you mind repeating the question one more time?”
Fed independence is an important concern, apparently; that’s why Congress doesn’t subpoena it very often. The lack of oversight and the Fed’s traditional secrecy—again, there are good reasons for this—make it difficult to cover and at the same make covering it all the more imperative.
Naked Capitalism makes the important point that the Fed’s independence isn’t what it used to be, thanks particularly to Alan Greenspan, whose reputation seems to dim with each passing day.
It quotes former Federal Reserve economist Richard Alford who puts the Fed’s supposed independence in perspective:
Compare the behavior of the Chairmen of the 1950s and Volcker to that of Greenspan. Chairman Eccles and McCabe both lost their Chairmanships because they wouldn’t compromise Fed independence. They stood their ground even after being summoned to the White House. Martin, appointed by Truman, was in later life referred to by Truman as “the traitor” presumably for taking the punch bowl away. The public image of Volcker is that of a man who twice a year endured public Congressional assaults, resisted political pressure, and enabled the Fed to stay the course.
Greenspan, on the other hand, jumped at the chance to meet Clinton, traveling to Little Rock before the inauguration. Bob Woodward in his book “Maestro” quotes Clinton telling Gore after the pre-inauguration meeting: “We can do business.” Woodward also quotes Secretary of the Treasury Bentsen telling Clinton that they had effectively reached a “gentleman’s agreement” with Greenspan. The agreement evidently involved Greenspan’s support for budget deficit reduction financed in part by tax increases. It is not clear what Greenspan received.
That set a bad precedent:
Greenspan risked the NASDAQ bubble during the Clinton years (part of the quo for the quid?) and more recently implicitly accepted the risk of a housing bubble as he touted ARMs as the Bush Administration and Congress promoted the ownership society. Financial innovation was lauded while it produced short-term gains. The Fed failed to adequately pursue its regulatory responsibilities as it kept rates low, despite the relatively high levels of leverage, derivatives markets that dwarfed the underlying cash markets, breakdowns in lending standards and credit spreads that even it didn’t think compensated for the risks. Like Greenspan, the current Fed implicitly decided to risk long term stability rather than incur short-term costs.
And, now the Fed, doing a U-turn, is running off on its own, Alford says:
After failing to use the independence granted to it by statute, the Fed is now pushing the bounds of its legal authority. It is making decisions that might better be reserved for elected officials. It argues that these steps are necessary, but the Fed is being drawn into the micro management of credit allocation and income re-distribution — a far cry from “inflation targeting”. The Fed is willingly injecting itself into areas that are the provenance of the Congress.
Arguments rage about how we got into the current mess and how well we’re doing getting out of it. Without better Fed coverage, there’s no way to know.