The Journal did some three-yards-and-a-cloud-of-dust work last week on Wall Street’s retrograde lobbying efforts—particularly to keep credit-default swaps from being heavily regulated. The New York Times today takes the handoff and advances deep into the red zone.
Forcing the murky world of CDS into real openness would mean forcing them to be traded on public exchanges. Wall Street wants them traded in private clearinghouses, to keep some opacity, which means higher profits for Wall Street.
But increased transparency of derivatives trades would cut into banks’ profits — hence the banks’ opposition. Customers who trade derivatives would pay less if they knew what the prevailing market prices were.
Unsurprisingly, to say the least, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner is coming down on the Wall Street side. It’s what he does.
But what’s really interesting is that reporters Gretchen Morgenson and Don Van Natta Jr. get hold of a memo written by a Wall Street lobbying consortium. It matches up all too neatly with Geithner’s proposal, issued last week, to regulate CDS.
Mr. Rosen and other bank lobbyists have pushed on Capitol Hill to keep so-called customized swaps from being traded more openly. These are contracts written for the specific needs of a customer, whose one-of-a-kind nature makes them very hard to value or trade. Mr. Rosen has also argued that dealers should be able to trade through venues closely affiliated with banks rather than through more independent platforms like exchanges.
Mr. Rosen’s confidential memo, dated Feb. 10 and obtained by The New York Times, recommended that the biggest participants in the derivatives market should continue to be overseen by the Federal Reserve Board. Critics say the Fed has been an overly friendly regulator, which is why big banks favor it.
Mr. Rosen’s proposal for change was similar to the Treasury Department’s recently announced plan to increase oversight. Treasury officials say that their proposal was arrived at independently and that they sought input from dozens of sources.
“Independently,” huh? The Times has already reported several paragraphs up that the memo did, in fact, influence Treasury:
A confidential memo Mr. Rosen drafted and shared with the Treasury Department and leaders on Capitol Hill has, politicians and market participants say, played a pivotal role in shaping the debate over derivatives regulation.
So either Treasury is lying or the Times’s reporting is wrong. You make the call.
The paper reports that Geithner’s plan has a massive loophole:
…little disclosure would be required for more complicated derivatives, like the type of customized, credit-default swaps that helped bring down A.I.G. A.I.G. sold insurance related to mortgage securities, essentially making a big bet that those mortgages would not default.
If we know anything about Wall Street, it’s that you give them an inch and they’ll take two miles.
Like, for instance, when Obama put a Wall Street-pushover into Treasury Department, you get this:
What makes this fight different, say Wall Street critics and legislative leaders, is that financiers are aggressively seeking to fend off regulation of the very products and practices that directly contributed to the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. In contrast, after the savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s, the clout of the financial lobby diminished significantly.
Excellent historical context.
And who knew derivatives trading made up such a big portion of profits?
JPMorgan, the largest dealer of over-the-counter derivatives, earned $5 billion trading them in 2008, according to Reuters, making them one of its most profitable businesses.
That’s $5 billion in profit, not revenue, and much of that is derived from distortions in the market from its opacity, as the Journal pointed out last week. No wonder they’ve got the nerve to fight this stuff.