Winner: The New York Times’s Scott Shane. Just four months after remarks of F.B.I. director Robert Mueller were published on vanityfair.com, two days after FCP asked Shane’s editor why they had never been reported in the Times, and one day after FCP wrote about them for the third time, the intrepid Timesman finally picked up the telephone and called the F.B.I. to find out whether Mueller had really said that he did not believe that torture had produced any information that disrupted attacks on the U.S. “The quote is accurate,” an F.B.I. spokesman confirmed, and Shane, today, finally managed to get that story into the Times.
Sinner: Scott Shane. Unfortunately, the same reporter spent much of the rest of today’s “news analysis” repeating the dubious claims of Bush, Cheney, and four former C.I.A. directors who assert that torture did produce important information.
Question: Why hasn’t Shane made the same elemental observation that a fine New York Times editorial made today: “Mr. Cheney claims that the waterboarding saved thousands of lives. Most accounts that don’t come from officials involved in the formation of those policies suggest that that is not the case”?
Answer: The people writing Times editorials are much better journalists than most of the reporters writing about torture for the news department. On most days, Shane exhibits the same degree of skepticism towards official sources that Judith Miller did during the run-up to the Iraq War.
Winner: Rachel Maddow, who actually understands what the torture debate is about. If you watched either of the interviews she conducted last night with author Ron Suskind or American interrogator Colonel Seven Kleinman, you learned more relevant facts about this subject than you would by reading a month’s worth of stories in The New York Times:
[Maddow with Suskind]
[Maddow with Colonel Steven Kleinman]
Here is a key passage of Maddow’s interview with Kleinman:
Maddow: Why would SERE methods be used in interrogation, if they were known to be used to have been designed to elicit false confessions?
Kleinman: At the very senior levels of government, surprisingly, the understanding of the complexities of interrogation is rare. It really is. It’s probably shaped more by the television show 24 than by practitioners of the art. There are a lot of people who don’t understand the difference between a model that would train people to resist harsh interrogation—and the purpose of that was to compel people to produce propaganda—and intelligence interrogation, which is designed to elicit cooperation and therefore timely, accurate, and comprehensive intelligence. They appear almost similar on the surface but there’s a very profound difference, and those two cannot be crossed.
Maddow: Defenders of the Bush administration interrogation program say that these harsh techniques were only used in extremely controlled circumstances on a very small number of people by only highly trained personnel. It was an elite practice. Does that accord to what you saw in Iraq and how you know these techniques were used?
Kleinman: Not at all. First of all, it is not an elite practice. ’Enhanced interrogation technique’—that term would connote an elite program, an advanced program, one conducted by sophisticated practitioners—and nothing could be further from the truth. The best interrogators in this country understand how to interrogate. And that’s largely a relationship-based, culturally elite, finessed approach. It’s systematic and it’s patient. That’s what produces information. To use SERE methods, or to think that one can use physicality or heavy stress to produce useful, reliable information is just a misnomer. It’s not backed up by operational experience, and it’s not backed up by one shred of scientific evidence.
Which is why statements like this one, in the story Shane and Mark Mazzetti wrote yesterday (and which led the paper!), are simply nonsensical:
Whether the same information could have been acquired using the traditional, noncoercive methods that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military have long used is impossible to say, and former Bush administration officials say they did not have the luxury of time to develop a more patient approach, given that they had intelligence warnings of further attacks.