The Financial Times runs an excellent analysis by columnist John Authers looking at how the “cult of equity” has been dead wrong.
It’s something we’ve touched on here and there—that the idea that investing in stocks always works over the long haul has been proven utterly false, but Authers really nails its coffin shut and looks at some of the other serious implications of the bust.
The crash has forced professional investors and academics to question the theoretical underpinnings of modern finance. The most basic assumptions of the investment industry, and the products they offer to the public, must be reconsidered from scratch. Indeed, the very reason for the industry to exist – a belief that experts make the smartest decisions on where people’s money will do best – is up for scrutiny as a result.
See, Wall Street—and much of the business press—doesn’t get this. That’s why I talk about “the bubble” so often. They’ve yet to realize that the Masters of the Universe have done irreparable damage to the conventional wisdom that the markets were a relatively fair place that rewarded patience in the long run. That belief enabled executives to loot their firms for massive pay packages, which the people overlooked as long as they got their small piece of the gains.
But now the regular investor has seen she’s been sold a bill of goods and taken on loads of risk—for what? Returns that equal those of much safer Treasury bonds over the last forty years:
US stocks have fallen more than 60 per cent in real terms since the market peaked in 2000. Anyone who started saving 40 years ago, when the postwar “baby boom” generation was just joining the workforce, has found that stocks have performed no better than 20-year government bonds since then, a forthcoming article by Robert Arnott for the Journal of Indexes shows. These people want to retire soon and the “cult of the equity” has let them down.
Meanwhile, how have CEO’s done over the last forty years while investors have piddled along? Do I need to ask?
Authers also shows how events have perhaps (we can only hope) issued mortal wounds to the efficient-markets theory, that beloved tenet of the laissez-faire folks.
Further, recent experience challenges that basis of modern finance, the “efficient markets hypothesis”, which in its strongest form holds that prices of securities always reflect all known information. This implies that stocks will react to each new piece of information, yet without following any set trend – a description that cannot be applied to the events of the past 18 months.
I love this kind of long-term analysis, something we get far too little of in business reporting:
Instead, the cult of the equity and the efficient markets hypothesis begin to look like phenomena born of the uniquely positive conditions in the middle of the last century. For decades until 1959, the yield paid out in dividends on stocks was higher than the yield paid out by bonds. This was to compensate investors for the extra risk involved in buying equities. In 1951, as the building blocks of the efficient-markets theory began to appear in academic journals, US stocks yielded as much as 7 per cent, compared with only 2 per cent on bonds.
“The 1950s marked the start of a period of relative peace and prosperity. It came on the heels of a tumultuous 50 years that included two world wars and an economic depression. In hindsight, the case for equities over bonds was especially compelling in the early 1950s,” says Robert Buckland, chief global equity strategist for Citigroup.