politics

Neocon Critics of the ISG Report Have a Lot of Explaining To Do

An entertaining look back at the uneven track record of some conservative critics of the Baker-Hamilton report.
December 11, 2006

In their continuing coverage of the fallout from the Baker-Hamilton report issued last week, the Washington Post‘s Michael Abramowitz and Glenn Kessler yesterday took stock of some of the criticisms that have “burst forth from the leading institutions of the right: the National Review, the Wall Street Journal editorial page and the Weekly Standard; conservative talk radio; and scholars at some of Washington’s top think tanks.”

It was a worthy subject for an article, and by focusing on what the conservative commentariat had to say — particularly those who appear to have the mostly tin ear of the White House — it serves as something of a primer on how the Bush administration might push back in the days and weeks ahead. But what struck us about the piece was how it was presented as a sober assessment from the “wise men” of the Right. We are, implicitly, expected to take these guys seriously on the subject of Iraq, so as a public service we thought it worthwhile to recall what some of these assembled luminaries have said in the recent past about Iraq. We’ll start with Kenneth R. Weinstein, the chief executive of the Hudson Institute, who the Post quoted as calling some of the report’s recommendations “preposterous, period.”

Perhaps, but consider this gem from February 2003, when Weinstein voiced support for the invasion of Iraq:

From the ashes of Saddam’s dictatorship would arise a pro-American regime, a model of openness and prosperity for the Arab world. Regime change would embolden pro-Western forces throughout the Middle East to act against the forces of darkness, including Iran’s educated middle class who are increasingly embittered by the rule of the mullahs …

(If plenty of less-wise men and women hadn’t been robustly skeptical of such utopian dreams when they were originally proffered, their ranks could rightly be accused of relying on that most accommodating of crutches, in hindsight.)

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Weinstein also told the Post this past July that “Given the laundry list of global challenges, the administration has had to make dozens and dozens of tough calls — and overwhelmingly it’s been right.”

The majority of Americans — according to public opinion polls taken since the 2004 elections — would disagree with him on this point, but no matter, if the Post considers him a serious thinker, then we’ll go along for the ride.

Next up is Frank J. Gaffney Jr., a former Reagan administration figure who heads the Center for Security Policy, and who’s definitely no fan of Jim Baker. Gaffney told the Post that “It seems so transparently in keeping with [Baker’s] modus operandi: the quest for the deal without regard for the content or the repercussions.”

What was that about “repercussions,” Mr. Gaffney? From February 2003, looking ahead to the looming invasion:

… you’ll see I think an outpouring of appreciation for their liberation that will make what we saw in Afghanistan recently pale by comparison. You’ll see, moreover, evidence in the files and the bunkers that become available to our military, evidence not only of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction programs and his future ambitions for their use perhaps and for aggression against his neighbors, but also, I would be willing to bet, evidence of his past complicity with acts of terror against the West, perhaps more generally but certainly against the United States which in turn I think will further vindicate the course of action that this president is courageously embarked upon.

Flush with victory after the fall of Saddam’s regime, Gaffney took to the pages of the Washington Times on April 15, 2003 to rattle his saber, asking “Who’s Next in Line?” “The United States and a coalition of the willing should bring to bear whatever techniques are necessary — including military force — to effect behavior modification and/or regime change in Damascus, as well. By so doing, freedom stands to get a two-fer: liberating both Syria and Lebanon.”

But he wasn’t done. On May 28, 2004 he wrote in the National Review that in Iraq, “the Coalition’s resources have proven ample to establish and maintain security in nearly all of the country.” Baghdad and the entire al-Anbar province notwithstanding.

Moving on, the Post tapped Michael Rubin, a former Pentagon aide who resigned in protest from the Iraq Study Group’s expert panel, who called the group’s report a “Cliff Notes high school paper.”

Rubin was an advocate for war in 2002 and 2003, making the case for an easy victory in The New Republic in September 2002. According to him, it was going to be a piece of cake :

While newspaper leaks have featured sobering assessments of the number of U.S. troops needed for an Iraq war, such numbers can be deceiving. Combat troops typically account for less than half of any deployment; the remaining support personnel serve outside the arena of battle. And the number of U.S. troops who would actually enter Baghdad would be far less even than that…there’s good reason to believe that the risk of taking on Saddam is — thankfully — far lower than the skeptics would have us believe.

William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard, has also publicly slammed the report, and he shows up in the Post piece, too. But let’s not forget some of Bill’s greatest hits (he has been proven wrong on just about every count concerning the war), like this chest-thumping entry just days before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, in which he boldly declared that “the war itself will clarify who was right and who was wrong about weapons of mass destruction.” Damn right.

In October 2002, he told NPR that “”We know that over the last three or four weeks, [Saddam] has moved many of his chemical and biological weapons programs in preparation for possible U.S. attacks, and a few weeks into the war, he also told NPR that “There’s been a certain amount of pop sociology in America that the Shia can’t get along with the Sunni and the Shia in Iraq want to establish some kind of Islamic fundamentalist regime. There’s been almost no evidence of that at all. Iraq’s always been very secular.”

Then there is the “prince of darkness” himself, Richard Perle. He called the Baker report “a monumental disappointment.” Before hearing him out, consider this pearl, delivered on a July 11, 2002 episode of the PBS series Wide Angle, when he insisted that the war in Iraq “isn’t going to be over in 24 hours, but it isn’t going to be months either.”

Or this one, from December 2001, when he self-confidently, proclaimed, “We know that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction: We know he has anthrax; we know he has nerve agents…he is busily at work on a nuclear weapon.”

When it comes to Iraq these guys were either fantastically wrong or they were bullshitting us all. If the Post is now asking readers to listen to their criticisms of the ISG report — the first comprehensive (if at times deeply flawed) attempt to find a solution that goes beyond the president’s “stay the course” rhetoric — then it has a duty to remind readers of this relevant recent history.

Paul McLeary is a former CJR staff writer. Since 2008, he has covered the Pentagon for Foreign Policy, Defense News, Breaking Defense, and other outlets. He is currently a defense reporter for Politico.